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This Article explores a great paradox at the heart of the prevailing 
paradigm of American antidiscrimination law: the colorblindness ideal. 
In theory, and often in practice, that ideal is animated by a genuine 
commitment to liberal, individualist, race-neutral egalitarianism. For 
many of its partisans, colorblindness entails not only a negative 
injunction against race-conscious decisionmaking, but also, crucially, an 
affirmative program for the achievement of true racial equality. For 
these proponents, scrupulously race-neutral decisionmaking both 
advances the interests of racial minorities and embodies the best 
aspirations of the civil rights movement. In this worldview, 
colorblindness offers the only true antidote for both racial inequality and 
racism itself, hastening the day when race will be, as the Supreme Court 
has put it, "truly irrelevant."l And indeed, the logical simplicity and 
moral clarity of the colorblindness ideal give it a certain intuitive 
appeal.2 
This Article argues that recent history in fact belies such claims. 
Critics of the colorblindness model have long observed that the Supreme 
Court's insistence on race-neutrality has proven a poor remedy for 
entrenched racial inequality.3 Remarkably-and here is the paradox-
the Court's very enforcement of the colorblindness ideal has itself fueled 
the reproduction of racial difference. In the service of colorblindness, 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, in dialogue with a host of influential 
social scientists and public intellectuals, redefined racial inequality from 
a wrong in and of itself-and as such a presumptive object of civil rights 
enforcement-to a morally benign legal irrelevancy. The Court did so 
by reconstructing African Americans from a class characterized, for the 
purposes of civil rights enforcement, by the systematic social, economic, 
I. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, SIS U.S. 200, 229 (1995). 
2. In order to focus on the colorblindness ideal's paradoxical intemallogic, this Article brackets 
the important question of whether the rhetoric of race-neutrality sometimes is invoked as a convenient 
subterfuge for old-fashioned white supremacist racial projects. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Persuasion 
and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1344 (1986) 
(documenting the Reagan administration's ''underlying impulse to protect the prerogatives of whites 
against the least hint of encroachment by claims of racial justice," all in the name of colorblind ness). 
3. As courts and scholars have noted, a legal equality regime that enjoins only racial 
classifications often has the effect of permitting, and even ratifYing, a host of facially "race-neutral" 
policies and practices that perpetuate pre-existing forms of racial inequality. Prominent examples 
include the use of educational and testing requirements as a condition of employment eligibility (see, 
e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424 (1971»; the practice of funding public schools through 
local property taxes (see, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dis!. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973»; the 
recognition of workplace seniority accrued in an era of overt racial discrimination (see, e.g., Quarles v. 
Phillip Morris Co., 279 F.Supp. 505 (E.D.Va. 1968». See generally Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing 
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 
62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978); Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How 'Color 
Blindness' Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REv. 77 (2000). 
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and political subordination endured by its members, to a class 
characterized by its ethnically distinctive culture. By unveiling this 
critically neglected racial project, this Article casts new light on how 
American antidiscrimination law, though unequivocally committed to 
racial equality in theory, has learned to live with racial inequality in 
fact.4 
As it has been articulated by its most vocal champions, the 
colorblindness ideal is, at least in theory, genuinely egalitarian. By 
disavowing classifications drawn on the basis of race, the theory runs, 
we affirm the moral irrelevance of race and honor equal opportunity. As 
a theory of equality, the colorblindness ideal appeals for its moral and 
political authority to a vision of free competition among individuals in a 
race-neutral marketplace, where scarce social and economic goods are 
distributed approximately according to individual merit.5 
Notwithstanding its success in the legal marketplace of ideas, however, 
colorblindness has always presented its friends and foes alike with a 
nagging contradiction: If race is truly irrelevant, why have blacks and 
other minority groups continued to occupy, in vastly disproportionate 
numbers, the lowest rungs of the occupational and educational ladder, 
long after Brown v. Board of Education6 and the Civil Rights Act of 
19647 presumably removed, or at least minimized, racial barriers to 
individual achievement? This tension has only grown sharper and more 
urgent with the passage of time, as new generations of blacks have come 
of age in the post-Jim Crow era, presumably enjoying the benefits of 
equal education and fair employment. 8 How has the colorblindness 
4. The doctrinal "retrenchment" of civil rights enforcement under the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts has, since its inception in the early 1970s, provoked vigorous objections from dissenting judges 
and legal scholars alike. Two constitutional law developments in particular-the adoption of a strict 
discriminatory intent requirement (see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Arlington Heights v. 
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979» 
and the establishment of racial classifications as the exclusive trigger for strict judicial scrutiny (see 
Regents ofUniv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Adarand, SIS U.S. at 200) have long drawn 
particularly trenchant criticism. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,S 
PHIL. & PUEL. AFF. 107 (1976); Freeman, supra note 3; Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. I (1977); Charles R. Lawrence III, The id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); Daniel R. Ortiz, 
The Myth of intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105 (1989); David A. Strauss, 
Discriminatory intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L.R. 935 (1989). 
5. Important analyses of colorblindness discourse and its relationship to market-oriented notions 
of equality include MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1990s (2nd ed. 1994); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-
Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. I (1991); Siegel, Discrimination, supra note 3. 
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
7. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000». 
8. As Morton Horwitz has pointedly put it, adherents to a liberal individualist conception of 
civil rights enforcement have long been "unable to explain why an unusually large number of members 
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ideal, in all of its liberal triumphalism, remained intellectually, 
politically, and morally viable in the face of an American social and 
economic landscape marked by deeply entrenched racial inequality? 
Specifically, how have the champions of that ideal accounted for the 
gulf between their theory and the conspicuous racial disparities that have 
resulted from its application? To answer these questions is to explain 
how an equality regime plagued by such glaring contradictions has 
displaced the goal of eradicating inequality as the prevailing paradigm of 
civil rights enforcement. 
Colorblindness proponents could attribute such contradictions to the 
long shadow of historical subordination under which blacks as a class 
have continued to labor. Such an accounting, however, would cast 
serious doubt on whether colorblindness actually operates as a vehicle of 
racial equality. Instead, the internal logic of the colorblindness model 
itself has provided an appealing alternative explanation: If the race-
neutral marketplace functions as a competitive meritocracy, justly 
distributing rewards according to individual desert, then by implication 
it also acts as a testing ground of merit, accurately measuring the relative 
talent, effort, skill, or ability of individual competitors. To the extent 
that such outcomes are, in aggregate, distributed in group-salient 
patterns, they do not impugn the fairness of the colorblind marketplace, 
but rather reflect real differences between groups. 
These avowed racial egalitarians have learned to talk about those 
differences, in tum, by embracing a burgeoning body of social scientific 
theory on American ethnic dynamics. This Article argues that by 
recasting African Americans as just one among the nation's many 
"ethnic groups," colorblindness proponents-including a majority of the 
Supreme Court-have forged the trope of black ethnicity into a 
distinctly modem, politically respectable, and ostensibly anti-racist 
account of racial difference in which most racial inequality lies beyond 
the scope of antidiscrimination law.9 Moreover, it is an account that, by 
emphasizing the historical and cultural-as opposed to "natural" or 
"genetic"-sources of group difference, has resonated with both 
of particular groups seem regularly to come out at the bottom." Morton J. Horwitz, The Jurisprudence 
o/Brown and the Dilemmas o/Liberalism, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 599, 608 (1979). 
9. Robert Post provides a productive framework for thinking about the interaction between 
"culture," understood as "the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors," and the development of legal 
doctrine. Robert C. Post, Forward: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 
HARV. L. REv. 4, 8 (2003). Although Post's analysis is addressed specifically to constitutional law, 
while this Article is addressed equally to the Supreme Court's rendering of Title VII, his formulation 
remains apt. "[C)onstitutional law and culture are locked in a dialectical relationship," Post explains, 
"so that constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture. . .. [T]he Court in fact 
commonly constructs constitutional law in the context of an ongoing dialogue with culture, so that 
culture is inevitably (and properly) incorporated into the warp and woof of constitutional law." ld. 
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mainstream civil rights and multiculturalist discourses. 
Scholarly critics of the colorblindness model of racial equality have 
noted its appropriation of ethnicity theory, and argued that it amounts to 
an inconsistent, and even contradictory, approach to race. The legal and 
intellectual coherence of an equality regime that obliges decisionmakers 
to disregard race, they point out, paradoxically has become dependent on 
an auxiliary logic of racial difference. lo This Article builds on this 
insight but argues that it misstates the nature of the paradox. In fact, 
colorblindness proponents have appropriated the new racialism of black 
ethnicity not in spite of their genuine commitment to liberal, 
individualistic, race-neutral egalitarianism, but rather precisely because 
of it. By reducing the meaning of legal equality to the racially neutral 
treatment of individuals, policymakers and courts effectively generated 
ascriptions of racial difference. If this analysis proves compelling, 
moreover, it casts doubt on the Supreme Court's most forceful moral 
argument for subjecting all racial classifications to strict constitutional 
scrutiny: that racial classifications "can only exacerbate rather than 
reduce prejudice,,,11 and that only by prohibiting such classifications can 
we achieve "an equality that will make race irrelevant."12 This Article 
maintains that not only is colorblind competition a poor remedy for the 
ongoing effects of past racial subordination; it is an implausible, and 
even counterproductive, antidote for the reproduction of racialism itself. 
Part I explores the conceptual landscape of antidiscrimination law in 
the formative decade of civil rights enforcement. It demonstrates that in 
the wake of the 1964 Act, civil rights activists, federal officials, and the 
Supreme Court alike routinely presumed that in the absence of unlawful 
discrimination, African Americans and other racial minorities would 
enjoy important social and economic goods roughly in proportion to 
their membership in the population. More recent controversy over racial 
10. See, e.g., John O. Calmore, Exploring Michael Omi's "Messy" Real World of Race: An 
Essay for "Naked People Longing to Swim Free," 15 LAW & INEQ. 25 (1997); Gotanda, supra note 5; 
Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction of Inequality, 69 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 1753 
(2001); John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the Rhetoric Against 
Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REv. 313 (1994); Siegel, Discrimination, supra note 3; Reva B. Siegel, 
The Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind Constitutionalism: The Case of Hopwood v. Texas, in RACE AND 
REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Robert Post & Michael Rogin, eds. 1998). All of these 
studies, this one included, have profited from Michael Omi and Howard Winant's indispensable 
treatment of the issue in their landmark RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 5. 
11. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
12. Croson, 488 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also id. at 495 (arguing that to subject 
racial classifications to anything less than strict scrutiny would "assure[] that race will always be 
relevant in American life"); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the "racial 
paternalism" affirmative action programs "stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority"). 
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preferences has obscured the extent to which this presumption of racial 
proportionality shaped both early Title VII enforcement and equal 
protection law . 
. Part II analyzes an intellectual sea change in how the Supreme Court, 
in concert with a host of influential public intellectuals and political 
writers, accounted for racial inequality in the 1970s and 1980s. It 
documents the joint ascendancy of the paradoxical yet mutually 
enforcing discourses of colorblind competition and black ethnic 
difference, and demonstrates how colorblindness proponents recast the 
meaning of conspicuous racial underrepresentation, from a potentially 
actionable measure of illicit discrimination to a morally benign legal 
irrelevancy. 
Part III then demonstrates how the Burger and Rehnquist Courts 
assimilated the "black ethnicity" critique of racial proportionality into 
three important domains of civil rights jurisprudence: the "disparate 
impact" action under Title VII; racial preferences in public construction 
contracting; and affirmative action in higher education. That critique 
supplied the essential rationale with which the Court disavowed the 
pursuit of racially proportionate representation as a guiding value of 
American antidiscrimination law. As a result, by the end of the 1980s a 
new consensus had emerged that to enlist federal antidiscrimination law 
to that end would contravene the proper scope of both the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the 1964 Act. 
I. RACIAL PROPORTIONALITY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 
In 1963, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) 
launched a broad-based economic development program called 
Operation Breadbasket. Martin Luther King, Jr. explained to an 
audience of SCLC members a few years later that the program centered 
on consumer boycotts of local stores and industries that excluded blacks 
from meaningful job opportunities. It was, he stated, "a very simple 
program, but a powerful one. . .. It simply says that we will no longer 
send our money where we can not get substantial jobs.,,13 By way of 
illustration, King recounted a recent visit to a large Cleveland dairy 
producer. When he "went to get the facts about their employment," 
King "discovered that they had 442 employees and only 43 Negroes, yet 
the Negro population of Cleveland is thirty-five percent of the 
13. Martin Luther King, Jr., "Where Do We Go From Here?" Annual Report Delivered at the 
Eleventh Convention of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (August 16, 1967) (transcript on 
file with author). 
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total .... ,,14 The injustice reflected in such numbers was manifest. 
It was painfully self-evident to King and his audience that the 
dramatic underrepresentation of blacks among local dairy employees 
represented a civil rights problem. After all, why would one doubt that, 
but for pervasive racial discrimination, Cleveland blacks would have 
held the dairy jobs roughly in proportion to their membership in the 
local population? In the early years of civil rights enforcement, this 
presumption of racial proportionality directly and explicitly informed 
not only civil rights activism, but also federal antidiscrimination law 
relating to employment, school desegregation, and voting. In marked 
contrast to the conventional wisdom of the post-civil-rights era, for the 
generation of activists, legislators and judges that made the Second 
Reconstruction, "equality of opportunity" and "equality of results" 
represented complementary, rather than divergent, aspirations. 15 
A. Federal Enforcement of the Antidiscrimination Mandate, 
1965-1971 
Modem judges and legal commentators across the political spectrum 
routinely understand Title VII of the 1964 Act to be the cardinal 
expression of a pure disparate treatment regime, in which racial 
inequality unaccompanied by evidence of intentional discrimination is 
legally irrelevant. 16 For the coalition of civil rights activists and liberal 
14. Id. 
15. In contemporary rubric, "equality of opportunity" is typically used to mean procedural 
colorblindness, in which the injunction against treating an applicant or employee unfavorably on account 
of her race is scrupulously enforced, and each individual is thus judged solely on the basis of her merit. 
"Equality of results," by contrast, is used to describe a process in which decisionmakers employ racial 
preferences in order to achieve a pre-designated racial distribution of some desired good-jobs, or 
admissions to a university, for example-and in which each individual is evaluated on the basis of her 
membership in a particular racial group instead of, or at least in addition to, her merit. The issue of 
racial preferences has dominated the public debate. Conservatives and opponents of affirmative action 
decry the pursuit of racial proportionality as heavy-handed governmental "social engineering." See, e.g., 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349, 355, 372 (2003) (Thomas, 1., dissenting) (condemning 
university administrators' "meddling" attempts at "racial balancing" as part of a misguided project of 
"social experiments"). Even judicial defenders of racial preferences today tend to disavow the goal of 
racial representation, instead justifying such measures as a means to enhance racial "diversity." See, 
e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329-30 (distinguishing the compelling state interest of achieving student body 
"diversity" from constitutionally impermissible "racial balancing"). See infra text accompanying notes 
128-151, and 185-208. 
16. Indeed, to the modern ear Title VII sounds loudly and clearly in the language of 
colorblindness. The bill's authors not only resisted pleas from some civil rights advocates to require 
employers to redress racial imbalances in their workforces, if necessary through racial preferences; in 
Section 703(j), added to pacify the bill's critics, they expressly disavowed such a purpose: 
Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any employer ... to grant 
preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, 
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policymakers responsible for the passage and enforcement of the 1964 
Act, however, the unambiguous purpose of Title VII was both to 
eradicate unequal treatment and to bring about black economic 
equality. 17 
In the period between 1965 and 1971, Justice Department lawyers, 
EEOC administrators, civil rights advocates, and ultimately the federal 
courts transformed racial proportionality from a latent value and hoped-
for result of antidiscrimination enforcement, to an affirmative goal of the 
nation's new equality regime. Legal scholars typically interpret this 
transformation as a real, though short-lived, ascendancy of what is 
sometimes called an "anti subordination" theory of legal equality-
characterized by a concern with providing corrective justice to 
religion, sex, or national origin ... on account of an imbalance which may exist with 
respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race ... employed by an 
employer ... in any community, state, section, or other area, or in the available work 
force .... 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 § 7030), 78 Stat. 241, 257 (1964) (codified in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(j)(2000). The bill's Senate sponsors circulated a detailed document, known as the "Clark-
Case memorandum" (after Senate floor managers Joseph Clark (D-PA) and Clifford Case (R-NJ», 
reassuring critics that to require an employer to achieve a "racial balance" in its workforce would itself 
be a violation of Title VII. 110 CONGo REc. 7213 (April 8, 1964). 
17. Indeed, even as the Clark-Case memorandum insisted that the Senate bill recognized only an 
individual right to equal employment opportunity, it also emphasized that "the presence of other 
members of the same minority group in the workforce may be a relevant factor in detennining if in a 
given case a decision to hire or refuse to hire was based on race .... " 110 CONGo REC. 7213 (April 8, 
1964). If the identification of statistical disparities in an employer's workforce was the most efficient 
way to detect a pattern of discrimination, the memorandum explained, state laws proscribing the 
identification of a person's race on employment applications-a hallmark achievement of the northern 
states' uneven yet progressive embrace of colorblindness in the 1940s and I 950s-would have to yield 
to the need for racial data. As a result, many seasoned civil rights advocates reevaluated their 
unconditional commitment to colorblindness. As the Urban League's Edwin Berry testified, "in the 
early 1940s, when the great drive was to get race off the records, I was one of the leaders in it. 1 was 
hollering the loudest, and now I apologize for having done it because I think it was a mistake." House 
Commillee on Education and Labor, Equal Employment Opportunity: Hearings Before the Special 
Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education and Labor, 87th Congo 322 (\962) (quoted in 
PAUL D. MORENO, FROM DIRECT ACTION TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAW AND 
POLICY IN AMERICA, 1933-I 972, 20 I). See generally HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: 
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-1972 117-19 (1990). 
Some proponents of the Act reasoned that because pervasive race discrimination was the direct and 
unambiguous cause of black economic equality, purging the nation's employment system of 
discriminatory practices would, in due course, result in something approximating racially proportionate 
representation. As sociologist John David Skrentny explains, for the architects of Title VII the 
coiorblindness model was "derived from a taken-for-granted principle of causality ... that a fair and 
equal society will naturally occur when people are free." JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 15 (1996). When Congress 
enacted the colorblindness model into law, it thus did so "with the belief or expectation that freedom 
from discrimination would bring about black equality [and) comparable statistical rates of black and 
white employment and unemployment." [d. That is to say, one of the key aspirations of the new 
colorblindness regime was to bring about "equality of results." 
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discriminated-against groups-over an "anticlassification" theory-
characterized by a concern with ensuring procedural colorblindness. 
Accordingly, progressive constitutional scholars have celebrated this 
period as a triumph of substantive equality over the conservative 
formalism of the colorblindness model. For such scholars, this body of 
jurisprudence represents the high-water mark of race equality law, 
against which the Supreme Court's subsequent retreat should be 
measured. IS Conservatives, by contrast, have condemned the growing 
race-consciousness of the period as a betrayal of what they see as the 
pristine colorblindness mandate of Brown and the 1964 Act. 19 Although 
this neat analytical division of antidiscrimination theory into distinct, 
competing principles or ideological camps has been indispensable in 
clarifying the meaning and stakes of different conceptions of racial 
equality, it does not accurately account for how ideas about equality and 
discrimination actually unfolded over time.20 
Racial proportionality emerged as a central, express value of 
American antidiscrimination law as a direct result of the colorblindness 
model's failure to meet increasingly urgent demands for racial justice. 
Prior to and immediately following the adoption of Title VII, 
policymakers and civil rights officials had viewed conspicuous racial 
underrepresentation as compelling evidence of intentional 
discrimination. Within a few short years, government lawyers, civil 
rights activists, and courts had expanded the potential probativeness of 
racial underrepresentation outward, from identifying patterns of 
disparate treatment by a particular employer or industry to detecting the 
effects of "institutional" or "societal" discrimination. Crucially, the 
absence of racial proportionality said something about an employer, an 
industry, or an institution. 
1. Racial Underrepresentation as "Sociological Radar" 
Title VII's enforcement structure conceded much to the Act's critics. 
Perhaps most significantly, it denied the Equal Opportunity Employment 
Commission (EEOC)-the federal agency responsible for enforcing 
Title VII-the authority to issue cease-and-desist orders or to sue in 
18. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 4; Freeman, supra note 3; Michael Klarman, An Interpretive 
History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1991); Strauss, supra note 4. 
19. See, e.g., Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 
HARV. L. REv. 1312 (1986); Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 33 (1992). 
20. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 9 (2003) (demonstrating how 
antisubordination values have often shaped courts' application of the anticlassification rule). 
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federal court. The consignment of the EEOC to combating 
discrimination through persuasion and consultation, and by providing 
assistance to individual complainants, represented a distinct defeat for 
fair employment advocates. Yet the Act did enable the United States 
Attorney General to bring pattern or practice suits, thus preserving at 
least the potential for the kinds of wholesale actions preferred by the 
civil rights community? 1 Whether or not such potential would be 
fulfilled, however, depended more on the will of the Attorney General 
and the solicitousness of the federal courts than on Title VII's text. 
From the beginning, the federal administrators and lawyers 
responsible for enforcing Title VII understood the limitations of the 
individual-complaint-centered approach, and actively developed more 
ambitious alternatives. For the Justice Department, as well as the 
overburdened and understaffed EEOC, the identification of statistical 
disparities in the racial composition of a given workforce was essential 
to the enforcement of Title VII's injunction against intentional 
discrimination. The EEOC required every employer in its jurisdiction to 
complete a racial reporting fonn disclosing the race of each of its 
employees. EEOC advisor Alfred Blumrosen described the racial 
statistics thus obtained as a vital fonn of "sociological radar," which 
would enable the agency to identify patterns of disparate treatment.22 As 
Blumrosen explained, racial reporting was 
perhaps the most important tool in any program to eliminate employment 
discrimination. Here were lists of major employers excluding minorities 
in a massive way which outraged any reader of the statistics. . .. Here at 
last was a basis for government-initiated programs which were not based 
on complaints and which could focus on possible potential discriminators 
effectively. . .. There was a perennial shortage of manpower and money 
in antidiscrimination programs. If government could focus, through the 
reporting system, on those employers where underutilization was 
sharpest, there was a possibility of successfully combating 
discrimination.23 
For Blumrosen and the pragmatic officials who staffed the EEOC and 
the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, proceeding on the 
assumption that gross racial disparities were often probative of 
discriminatory intent was both intellectually uncontroversial and 
practically essential. The unstated but indispensable premise of this 
approach was that in the absence of disparate treatment, racial minorities 
would be represented more or less proportionally. 
21. GRAHAM, supra note 17, at 189-91. 
22. ALFRED BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 68 (1971). 
23. Id. at 68--69. 
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As it was employed in the early years of Title VII enforcement, the 
sociological radar approach thus yoked the presumption of racial 
proportionality to the pursuit of colorblindness in a way that will strike 
many contemporary readers as paradoxical. Although sociological radar 
unambiguously entailed a form of color consciousness, it was a color 
consciousness to be undertaken not by the employers under the Act's 
jurisdiction, but rather by Title VII's enforcers. Proportionality thus 
operated both as a key strategic premise and an expected consequence of 
the enforcement of equal treatment, even as the requirement that 
plaintiffs prove discriminatory intent remained conceptually intact. 
The intent requirement itself, however, came under increasing 
pressure from the weight of necessity. A wave of devastating race riots 
combined with the progressively more radical inflection of the civil 
rights movement to impress on national policymakers a new sense of 
urgency around the problem racial inequality in employment. 24 In his 
famous and controversial 1965 report, "The Negro Family," issued 
months before the first of the major riots, presidential advisor Daniel 
Moynihan postulated that the "principle challenge of the next phase of 
the Negro revolution is to make certain that equality of results will now 
follow. If we do not, there will be no social peace in the United States 
for generations.,,25 Within a few short months, a mounting urban crisis 
confirmed the prescience of Moynihan's prediction. Civil rights leaders 
and a politically diverse cast of national policymakers interpreted the 
riots as a symptom of blacks' frustration with chronic joblessness and 
poverty. "[T]he lesson of the revolution of rising expectations," Vice 
President Hubert Humphrey instructed, was that "20 million Americans 
will no longer be pacified by slogans or tokens.,,26 The colorblindness 
model of racial equality, only recently codified in the 1964 Act, 
increasingly struck many observers as inadequate and even nalve?7 As 
24. Each summer from 1964 to 1968, government officials and the American public watched as 
violent outbursts wracked the nation's cities. Notably, the vast majority of the violence occurred not in 
the historic bastions of white supremacy-the Jim Crow South-but in the nation's presumably more 
tolerant northern cities. Tens of thousands of blacks participated in hundreds of riots, looting 
businesses, destroying buildings, and engaging in violent clashes with police and civilians. Although 
Watts, in July 1964, and then Detroit and Newark, in the "long hot summer" of 1967, witnessed the most 
spectacular and catastrophic episodes, hundreds of smaller cities across the country also experienced 
unprecedented eruptions. The disturbances were responsible for more than 200 deaths and several 
thousand injuries. See ALLEN J. MATUS OW, THE UNRAVELING OF AMERICA (1984); LUCAS A. POWE, 
JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 274-76 (2000). 
25. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 3 
(U.S. Dep't of Labor 1965). 
26. "To Fulfill These Rights," Opening Meeting, White House Conference (June I, 1966), in 
MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, ED, 2 CIVIL RIGHTS, THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 153 
(1991). 
27. As Bayard Rustin noted in 1965, increasingly at issue in the civil rights movement was "not 
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Moynihan put it, the civil rights coalition's demand for equality of 
opportunity "is not (or at least no longer) a demand for liberty alone, but 
also a demand for equality-in terms of group results.,,28 Racial 
proportionality thus evolved from a strategic premise in, and expected 
consequence of, the pursuit of colorblindness, to an end in itself, parallel 
to but analytically independent from the injunction against disparate 
treatment. 29 
2. Racial Proportionality as an End in Itself: The Philadelphia Plan 
Civil rights advocates and federal officials moved seamlessly from 
using racial statistics to probe the intent behind various employment 
practices to policing the racial results of those practices. The federal 
government's campaign to integrate the construction industry illustrates 
the conceptual and legal contiguity of what subsequently became 
understood as competing modes of civil rights enforcement. 
Historically, the construction industry was suffused with a seemingly 
intractable culture of both overt and informal discrimination, and was 
notoriously hostile to blacks' demands for fair access to the lucrative 
skilled trades.30 The culturally exclusive dimension of the building 
trades made it a particularly elusive target for antidiscrimination 
enforcement. When trades umons were charged with racial 
civil rights, strictly speaking, but social and economic conditions." Bayard Rustin, From Protest to 
Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement, 39 COMMENT. 25, 26 (1965). The civil rights 
movement was "now concerned not merely with removing the barriers to full opportunity but with 
achieving the fact of equality." Id. at 27. 
28. MOYNIHAN, supra note 25, at 3. 
29. Federal civil rights administrators developed modes of antidiscrimination enforcement that 
placed increasingly direct pressure on employers to achieve racially balanced workforces. For example, 
the EEOC held a series of hearings to examine the employment practices of industries in which blacks 
were statistically underrepresented, according to the racial data obtained from the EEO-I forms. The 
express purpose of the hearings was not only to purge suspect industries and employers of intentional 
discrimination, but to "remedy" racial imbalances in their workforces by pressuring employers to 
achieve statistically proportionate minority "utilization." SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 132-33. Such 
strategies extended the probative logic of statistical underrepresentation-from the intent of individual 
employers, to the social, historical, and institutional disadvantages under which blacks competed in the 
newly "colorblind" employment market. 
30. For most of the twentieth century, explains historian Thomas Sugrue, the "building trades 
[were) a textbook example of the employment niche, a sector of the economy dominated by a single 
group and characterized by a long history of exclusion of competing groups." Thomas J. Sugrue, 
Breaking Through: The Troubled Origins of Affirmative Action in the Workplace, in COLOR LINES: 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, IMMIGRATION, AND CIVIL RIGHTS OPTIONS FOR AMERICA 41, 41 (John David 
Skrentny ed., 2001). One's trade was commonly understood not only as a source of income, but also as 
"a form of property, ... to be passed from father to son." Id at 43. In this context, many white workers 
viewed the federal government's new efforts to enhance blacks' economic opportunities as a direct 
threat to this entitlement. They especially feared that compelled racial integration would undermine the 
seniority system-one of the cardinal achievements of the twentieth-century labor movement. 
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discrimination, they typically defended their racial exclusivity by 
pointing to their long-standing practice of recruiting new members 
through family, ethnic, religious, and communal networks, and arguing 
that blacks simply did not apply for the positions at issue?1 Such a 
defense proved difficult to answer within the strict confines of the 
colorblindness framework. 
To combat this industry-wide intransigence, President Johnson 
established the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), in a 
September 1965 executive order.32 Lodged within the Department of 
Labor, the new agency was responsible for insuring non-discrimination 
among federal construction contractors. Like the EEOC, the OFCC 
faced the daunting challenge of reforming a set of institutional and 
cultural arrangements that virtually excluded blacks, but from which 
hard proof of disparate treatment was extraordinarily difficult to obtain. 
The OFCC, however, differed from the EEOC in at least two 
important respects. First, because the OFCC was created under Title VI, 
rather than Title VII, of the 1964 Act, it was not subject to Section 
703U)'s enforcement constraints disallowing federal administrators from 
requiring employees to remedy racial "imbalances" in their workforces 
through "preferential treatment.,,33 Second, the OFCC's enforcement 
leverage came from its authority to attach special conditions of non-
discrimination to valuable federal construction contracts.34 These 
distinctive aspects of the OFCC's legal and institutional position 
emboldened agency administrators to extend the logic of the EEOC's 
"sociological radar" approach, and ultimately to define discrimination in 
terms that bypassed the intent requirement altogether. 
The OFCC launched a series of metropolitan-area-based initiatives in 
four "special program areas," including St. Louis, San Francisco, 
Cleveland, and Philadelphia. The "Philadelphia Plan," the most 
ambitious and controversial of the OFCC's programs, quickly became 
the agency's signature enterprise. The Plan not only required that 
government contractors cease discriminating; it also instituted a "pre-
award approach" under which successful bidders were obliged to 
provide hiring plans that achieved designated levels of minority group 
representation within each component of a given construction project. 
Federal contractors and their unions were required to adopt specific 
goals and timetables to correct the racial imbalances in their 
31. Id. at 44. 
32. Exec. Order No. 11246,30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 28,1965). 
33. See supra note 14. 
34. TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS: A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 105 
(2004). 
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workforces.35 
Notably, President Nixon's Labor Department embraced, and 
arguably even extended, an enforcement logic that emphasized the 
achievement of "results" over merely purging employers' and unions' 
decisionmaking processes of discriminatory intent. 36 As Assistant 
Secretary of Labor Arthur Fletcher explained, "[v ]isible, measurable 
goals to correct obvious imbalances [were] essential." 37 After Congress 
tacitly endorsed the Philadelphia Plan,38 Secretary of Labor George 
Shultz signed an order extending the policy beyond the construction 
industry to all companies doing business with the federal govemment.39 
B. Racial Proportionality in the Lower Federal Courts 
By the end of the 1960s, the federal courts had imbued the meaning 
and scope of Title VII with the logic of racial proportionality. An 
inauspicious series of early district court decisions held that a statistical 
disparity between the racial composition of a labor union or company 
workforce and that of the local population did not, by itself, constitute a 
prima facie showing of discrimination.40 Led by the Fifth Circuit, the 
federal courts of appeals responded with a series of opinions that largely 
vindicated the Justice Department's ability to attack employment 
practices that, though racially neutral on their face, had the clear effect 
of excluding vastly disproportionate numbers of blacks. Following 
Blumrosen and others at the EEOC and Justice Department, the federal 
35. [d. 
36. Historians disagree over whether Nixon supported the Philadelphia Plan out of a sincere 
desire to end discrimination and enhance black economic opportunity, or as part of his "southern 
strategy" to capture the votes of southern whites. Substantial evidence exists for both arguments. 
Whatever Nixon's initial motives, however, by the 1970s, at least part of the reason for his continued 
support of the controversial program clearly lay in its having driven a wedge between two key 
Democratic Party constituencies-African Americans and organized labor. For an informative 
treatment of Nixon's support of the Philadelphia Plan, and his record on civil rights more generally, see 
DEA-1\! J. KOTLOWSKl, NIXON'S CIVIL RIGHTS: POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND POLICY 97-124 (200 I). 
37. ANDERSON, supra note 34, at 117. 
38. Congress expressed its views on the Philadelphia Plan only indirectly. After the United 
States Comptroller ruled that the program violated Title VII, Attorney General John Mitchell, on 
questionable legal authority, overruled the Comptroller'S decision. In response, a coalition of 
conservative Republicans and southern Democrats introduced an appropriations rider that would have 
made the Comptroller's judgment unreviewable by the Attorney General. At the strong urging of the 
White House, Congress defeated the rider. See ANDERSON, supra note 34, at 115-24. 
39. ANDERSON, supra note 34, at 124-25. 
40. See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'I Ass'n., Local 36, 280 F.Supp. 719, 728 
(£.D. Mo. 1968) ("Mere absence of Negroes in a particular group does not constitute proof of pattern or 
practice of discrimination."); United States v. Hayes Int'I Corp., 295 F.Supp. 803,808 (N.D. Ala. 1968) 
("The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not intended to penalize unions or others for their sins prior to the 
effective date of the Act .... "). 
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courts embraced the inferential logic that underlay the sociological radar 
approach: In the absence of discrimination, blacks would be represented 
in desirable jobs roughly in proportion to their membership in the local 
workforce; therefore, significant racial underrepresentation in a given 
job category raised a strong suspicion of intentional discrimination. "In 
racial discrimination cases," explained the Tenth Circuit, "statistics often 
demonstrate more than the testimony of many witnesses, and they 
should be given proper effect by the courtS.'.4l 
More challenging to courts than the meaning of racial statistics per se, 
however, was a cluster of employment practices that disproportionately 
excluded blacks from particular job categories, but which betrayed little 
or no direct evidence of discriminatory intent.42 Perhaps the most 
difficult and controversial question was whether and to what extent the 
1964 Act would curb white employees' seniority rights that had "vested" 
during the era of overt racial discrimination. The issue presented an 
archetypal conundrum: How to reconcile Title VII's insistence on equal 
employment opportunity with the serious competitive disadvantages 
that, as the result of generations of discrimination, blacks as a class 
brought to the employment market. Two seminal 1968 district court 
decisions-Quarles v. Phillip Morris,43 and United States v. 
Papermakers44-made clear that the courts' resolution of the question 
41. Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 247 (10th Cir. 1970). For additional 
examples of appellate decisions accepting the probative value of racial statistics, see Parham v. Sw. Bell 
Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421,426 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Int·l. Bhd of Elec. Workers, Local 38, 428 
F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assn., Local Union 36, 416 F.2d 
123 (8th Cir. 1969); Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 
(5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969). See also SKRENTNY, 
supra note 17, at 162-63. 
42. Employers routinely required that job applicants pass aptitude tests or fulfill educational 
requirements, for example, even though black applicants had received systematically inferior educations. 
See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F.Supp. 243 (M.D. N.C. 1968). Before the Supreme Court 
concluded in 1971 that such practices were actionable under Title VII (see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
40 I U.S. 422 (1970)), the lower federal courts were sharply divided. Several courts held in 1969 and 
1970 that a testing or educational requirement that lacked an "overriding legitimate business purpose" 
and which, in effect, "locked" incumbent black employees into traditionally black departments, 
constituted prohibited discrimination within the meaning of Title VII. See Braussard v. Schlumberger 
Well Serv., 315 F.Supp. 506, 510 (S.D. Tex. 1970). See also Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F.Supp. 1238 (N.D. 
Cal. 1970); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 1970 WL 162 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 22, 1970). Other courts 
agreed in principle with that rule, but when evaluating whether a testing or educational requirement was 
sufficiently related to a legitimate business purpose they applied such a liberal standard that virtually 
any facially neutral practice stood a good chance of surviving review, no matter how racially unequal its 
result. The leading authority for this line of cases was Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th 
Cir. 1970). See also Colbert v. H-K Corp., 1970 WL 120 (N.D.Ga. July 6, 1970); United States v. Nat'l 
Lead Co., 315 F.Supp. 912 (E.D. Mo. 1970). 
43. 279 F.Supp 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). 
44. Local 189, United States v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, 282 F.Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 
1968) (hereinafter "Papermakers I"). 
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would carry far-reaching implications across a broad range of social and 
institutional contexts. At issue, as the Quarles court saw it, was whether 
"the present consequences of past discrimination [were] covered by the 
act[.],,45 
As the courts of appeals took up Quarles and Papermakers, they 
adopted a set of interpretive doctrines that further built the presumption 
of racial proportionality into the legal machinery of Title VII 
enforcement. 46 The Fifth Circuit's decision in Papermakers is 
illustrative. Throughout his opinion, Judge John Minor Wisdom 
skillfully fused the question of whether the defendant union and 
employer had intended to discriminate with the documented racial 
results of the challenged employment practice. In so doing, he subtly 
transformed the legal meaning of "discrimination" under Title VII. At 
least two elements of Wisdom's reinterpretation warrant special notice. 
First, the opinion suggested that where an employment practice, though 
neutral on its face, has the "inevitable effect" 47 of maintaining blacks as 
a class in an inferior status, the racial results of that practice were 
compelling evidence that the defendant had intended to discriminate.48 
Second, Wisdom suggested that when a post-Act employment 
practice perpetuated the racial results of admittedly intentional pre-Act 
discrimination, the pre-Act intent to discriminate would be imputed to 
the post-Act practice. Because the choice to continue the seniority 
system "was not accidental," in the sense that "the defendant meant to 
45. Quarles, 279 F.Supp at 516. Prior to July I, 1965-the effective date of Title VII-the 
defendant employer in each case had maintained an overtly racially segregated workforce. Black and 
white employees had occupied entirely separate labor departments, each with its own union, seniority 
roster and job progression ladder. When the employers stopped hiring and assigning employees on the 
basis of race, incumbent black employees became newly eligible to transfer from their lower-paid, 
formerly all-black department to a higher-paid, formerly all-white department. Yet because the pre-
1965 seniority rosters remained in operation, a black employee could undertake such a transfer only at 
the cost of surrendering his accrued seniority, and thus "find[ing] himself junior to white employees 
holding less employment seniority who got their positions by reason of the company's formerly racially 
segregated employment policy." Id. at 514. The court granted that the restrictive transfers policy might 
serve "legitimate management functions," Id. at 513, including the promotion of efficiency, employee 
retention, and the reduction of necessary training. It nevertheless concluded that by maintaining a policy 
that so plainly transmitted past discrimination into present competitive disadvantage, the defendants had 
"intentionally engaged in unlawful employment practices by discriminating on the basis of race." Id. 
"Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns 
that existed before the act," the court explained. Id. at 516. 
46. For an informative discussion of this case law, see MORENO, supra note 17, at 236-61. 
47. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir. 
1969) (hereinafter "Papermakers II"). 
48. Quoting directly from Dobbins v. Local 212, 292 F.Supp. 413 (S.D.Ohio 1968), another 
seniority case, Judge Wisdom declared that "the requisite intent may be inferred from the fact that the 
defendants persisted in the conduct after its racial implications had become known to them." 
Papermakers /1,416 F.2d at 997. 
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do what he did," a court effectively could import the defendant's pre-Act 
intention into its post-Act state of mind.49 
Perhaps most tellingly, courts applying the "present effects" doctrine 
to procedurally race-neutral seniority systems tended to draw legal 
authority, not from employment discrimination cases, but from spheres 
of civil rights law addressing fundamental rights of citizenship-voting 
rights, school desegregation, and jury selection. As sociologist John 
David Skrentny notes, such spheres more readily lend themselves to the 
logic of proportionate representation because they are not subject to 
labor market values such as meritocratic competition and employer 
prerogative. 50 
Notably, the Third Circuit looked outside the employment context to 
uphold the Philadelphia Plan's requirement that federal contractors 
achieve prescribed levels of minority representation in their workforces. 
The court rejected the plaintiff contractors' claim that the Plan's 
imposition of "remedial quotas" required employers to violate Title 
VII's prohibition against hiring or classifying employees on the basis of 
race.51 Noting the "obvious underrepresentation,,52 of minorities in the 
six Philadelphia-area construction trades at issue, the court concluded 
that "[t]o read § 703(a) in the manner suggested by the plaintiffs we 
would have to attribute to Congress the intention to freeze the status quo 
and to foreclose remedial action under other authority designed to 
overcome existing evils.,,53 "Clearly the Philadelphia Plan is color-
conscious,,,54 the court acknowledged. But "[Un other contexts," the 
court instructed, citing to a school desegregation and housing 
discrimination case,55 "color-consciousness has been deemed to be an 
appropriate remedial posture. ,,56 
49. In a significant concession to employers' concerns about business efficiency and managerial 
prerogative, Judge Wisdom drew a distinction between employment practices rooted in "discriminatory 
intention," and those that were "related to a reasonable economic purpose." Id. at 992. "When the 
defendant's conduct evidences an economic purpose" he explained, "there is no discrimination under 
Title VII .... " !d. 
50. SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 163. 
51. Contractors Ass'n. ofE. Pa. v. Sec'y. of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 172-73 (3d Cir. 1971). 
52. Id. at 173. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. See Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22, 24 (2d Cir. 1967) (school desegregation); 
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968) (housing). 
56. Contractors' Ass 'n, 442 F.2d at 173. A number of Title VII decisions similarly justified 
applying racial proportionality reasoning in the employment context by quoting a line from Alabama v. 
United States, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1962), a pre-Civil Rights Act voting rights case: "In the problem 
of racial discrimination, statistics often tell much and Courts listen." Id. at 586. For examples of such 
cases, see Parham v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Ironworkers Local 
86, 443 F .2d 544, 511 (9th Cir. 1971); EEOC v. United Assn. of Journeymen & Apprentices, 31 I 
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Despite their overt concern with statistically demonstrable racial 
results, these lower court decisions did not abandon the intent 
requirement; rather, they stretched it. By sanctioning the evidentiary 
value of racial statistics, they operationalized the presumption of racial 
proportionality. Race-salient results were probative of discrimination 
even when unaccompanied by a particularized showing of 
discriminatory intent precisely because courts presumed that in the 
absence of past or present discrimination, blacks would be represented 
in many job categories roughly in proportion to their membership in the 
population. The same logic underlay the courts' endorsement of the 
"present effects" doctrine, which brought within Title VII's reach 
employment practices that, but for their disparate racial impacts, were 
concededly racially neutral. 
C. Disparate Impact and the Supreme Court 
As we have seen, although the lower federal courts did construe Title 
VII to prohibit a variety of facially neutral employment practices bearing 
racially unequal results, they always interpreted the prohibited practices, 
however tenuously, as an instance of present disparate treatment on the 
basis of race. With its 1971 decision in Griggs v. Duke Power, the 
Supreme Court dethroned the intent requirement, unanimously 
announcing that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does 
not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate 
as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups .... ,,57 Thus was born the 
disparate impact action-a conceptually distinct species of 
antidiscrimination law that did not depend on even an attenuated finding 
of discriminatory intent. 
The basic architecture of the disparate impact action, which the 
Supreme Court elaborated in Griggs and its subsequent decisions,58 
consists of three steps: First, a plaintiff must make a prima facie 
showing that a particular facially neutral employment practice-a hiring 
or promotion requirement, for example--exc1udes from consideration 
minority or women candidates at a disproportionately high rate. 59 
Second, once a plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to prove that the challenged practice nevertheless is justified 
F.Supp. 468, 471 (S.D.Ohio. 1970); Lea v. Cone Mils! Corp., 301 F.Supp. 97 (M.D. N.C. 1969). See 
also SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 163--65. 
57. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431-32 (1970). 
58. The Court summarized the structure of the disparate impact action in Do/hard v. Rawlinson, 
433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977). 
59. !d. 
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by "business necessity.,,60 Finally, if the defendant satisfies that burden, 
the plaintiff may still prevail if she can demonstrate that the employer 
could have met his workforce objectives through a less discriminatory 
alternative practice.61 
The precise meaning of "business necessity" has generated vigorous 
debate, both on and off of the Supreme Court. Crucially, disparate 
impact analysis sometimes requires an employer who has no intention of 
discriminating to justify employment practices that traditionally have 
been part of a business owner's managerial prerogative, simply because 
they disqualify a disproportionately high percentage of minority or 
women candidates. Proponents of a "strict" standard of business 
necessity maintain that such practices should escape liability only if they 
are "essential" to measuring candidates' capacity to perform the job in 
question.62 Proponents of a more permissive standard argue that such 
practices are justified by business necessity so long as they serve the 
employer's "legitimate" business goals.63 The stricter the definition of 
business necessity, the more strongly it imposes racial proportionality 
values on employers. And as we will see in this Section, in the years 
following Griggs the Court embraced a relatively strict standard. 
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Griggs has served as the primary 
doctrinal referent for all future disparate impact adjudication. The 
opinion itself contained a degree of ambiguity about the proper 
definition of business necessity. When an employment practice that was 
"fair in form" was shown to be "discriminatory in operation," Burger 
wrote, the "touchstone" of judicial review was "business necessity.,,64 
The Court's choice of the word "necessity," as well as its announcement 
that to survive review a discriminatory practice must "bear a 
demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for 
which it was used,,,65 suggests that the Court intended to constrain 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. See, e.g., Susan Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Cases, 30 GA. 
L. REV. 387 (1996); D. Marvin Jones, No Timefor Trumpets: Title VII. Equality, and the Fin de Siecle, 
92 MICH. L. REV. 2311 (1994); George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective 
Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297 (1987). 
63. See, e.g., Paul N. Cox, On A Blindered Impact Model: A Response, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 265 
(1997); Michael Evan Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the 
Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and Recommendations for Reform, 7 INDUST. 
REL. L.J. 429 (1985). Other commentators have advocated a variable standard, depending on the type of 
employment at issue. See, e.g., Andrew Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the 
Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479 (1996). 
64. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
65. Id. The Court explicitly endorsed the strict EEOC Guidelines regarding personnel tests: 
"These guidelines demand that employers using tests have available 'data demonstrating that the test is 
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significantly employers' discretion to engage in such practices. Indeed, 
this is how most lower courts originally interpreted Griggs.66 Burger 
added, however, that job requirements operating as "built in headwinds" 
to minority candidates must have a "manifest relationship to the 
employment in question.,,67 Though this formulation does not 
necessarily detract from the Court's other, more forceful iteration of 
business necessity, it supplied language that opponents of a strict 
necessity requirement could, and later did, seize on to justify a lesser 
burden for defendants. 
The Griggs Court evinced little hesitation in simply presuming that 
truly nondiscriminatory employment practices would usually result in 
racially proportionate representation; nor did it appear concerned that 
disparate impact analysis might conflict with employers' prerogatives to 
make market-rational hiring and promotion decisions. The Court 
dismissed the defendant's argument that the burden of proving business 
necessity would compel defendants to resort preemptively to hiring 
quotas. "Far from disparaging job qualifications as such," Burger 
explained, "Congress has made such qualifications the controlling 
factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant.,,68 
And if opponents of robust disparate impact analysis were heartened by 
the Court's 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis,69 requiring plaintiffs 
asserting an equal protection violation to prove discriminatory intent, 
any hopes that the doctrinal effects of Davis would carry over to Title 
VII were dashed the following term, when the Court reaffirmed that in 
order to survive disparate impact review, a "discriminatory employment 
practice must be ... necessary to safe and efficient job performance. ,,70 
predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are 
relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated.'" !d. at 434 n.9. 
66. See, e.g., Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co, 678 F.2d 992, 1016 (11th Cir. 1982); 
James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 355 (5th Cir. 1977); Watkins v. Scott Paper 
Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1168 (5th Cir. 1975). 
67. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 333. 
68. [d. at 436. Four years later, in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Court confirmed what 
appeared to be a relatively strict definition of business necessity. The message of both Griggs and the 
EEOC Guidelines, the Court explained, was that "discriminatory tests are impermissible unless shown, 
by professionally acceptable methods, to be predictive of or significantly correlated with important 
elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are 
being evaluated." Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (quoting EEOC 
Guidelines). 
69. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
70. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,331 (1977). Dothard represents perhaps the high-water 
mark of the strict necessity standard. Although Dothard is a sex discrimination case, the Court no doubt 
formulated its reasoning with an eye toward race discrimination. The Court held unanimously that the 
State of Alabama's requirement that prison guards satisfy a minimum height and weight requirement-a 
requirement that disproportionately excluded women from employment as prison guards--constituted 
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The unarticulated logical lynchpin of the strict necessity standard was 
the Court's expectation that truly meritorious evaluation processes 
would usually result in racially proportionate representation; in other 
words, that once employers removed unnecessary "headwinds" to 
minority opportunity, an appropriate racial "balance" would result 
without resort to "quotas." Notwithstanding its blow to the intent 
requirement, Griggs in fact represented an extension of, rather than a 
departure from, existing judicial common sense about how workplaces 
would look in the absence of discrimination. 
D. Racial Proportionality and Equal Protection: 
The Case a/Construction Set-Asides 
The Supreme Court's constitutional review of federal affirmative 
action closely paralleled its construction of disparate impact under Title 
VII. Just as the presumption of racial proportionality underlay its 
relatively strict rendering of business necessity, so did it directly inform 
the Court's posture toward congressional attempts to redress the present 
effects of past discrimination among federal contractors. In the 1980 
case of Fullilove v. Klutznick, the Court upheld against an equal 
protection challenge a congressional spending program requiring that ten 
percent of the funds granted to states and localities for public works 
projects be spent on supplies or services provided by minority business 
enterprises ("MBEs,,).7\ The question of whether the program was a 
valid exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
powers turned on whether Congress had gathered sufficient evidence 
that state and local governments were engaged in construction 
procurement practices that, though racially neutral in form and intent, 
had a "discriminatory impact [by] perpetuating the effects of past 
discrimination." 72 
Chief Justice Burger's opinion displayed remarkable deference 
toward Congress's purported factual basis for the MBE program.73 The 
Court cited approvingly a report of the House Subcommittee on Small 
Business Administration Oversight and Minority Enterprise, 
sex discrimination in violation of Title VII because the State had failed to demonstrate that a particular 
level of physical strength (the purported justification for the requirement) was required to perform the 
job effectively. Id. 
71. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
72. Id. at 477. 
73. Such deference is all the more remarkable in light of the intense scrutiny to which the 
Supreme Court has subjected Congress' asserted factual basis for both Commerce Clause and Section V 
legislation over the past decade. See. e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (\995); Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, SIS U.S. 200; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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recommending that the House pass the legislation.74 Observing that 
MBEs realized only about .65 percent of all business receipts in the 
United States, the report concluded that "these statistics are not the result 
of random chance. The presumption must be made that past 
discriminatory systems have resulted in present economic 
inequalities.,,75 "Although the Act recites no preambulatory 'findings,'" 
the Court resolved, "we are satisfied that Congress had abundant 
historical basis from which it could conclude that traditional 
procurement practices ... could perpetuate the effects of prior 
discrimination.,,76 Burger speculated that Congress must have 
considered the "marked disparity in the percentage of public contracts 
awarded to minority business enterprises" to have resulted not from "any 
lack of capable and qualified minority businesses, but from the existence 
and maintenance of barriers to competitive access which had their roots 
in racial and ethnic discrimination .... ,,77 Under-representation alone, 
the Chief Justice reasoned, went a long way toward establishing the 
necessary factual predicate for the legislation. 
The presumption of racial proportionality authorized the Court to 
infer conclusively from a showing of present racial underrepresentation 
that the disparity was the result of past discrimination. 78 This was the 
constitutionally necessary evidentiary basis for any race-conscious 
congressional "remedy," and, crucially, it enabled policymakers to 
pursue increased minority participation without having to show specific 
institutional discrimination. The Supreme Court soon would adopt a 
markedly different view of how particular jobs were likely to be 
distributed in the absence of past discrimination, as the presumption of 
racial proportionality gave way to a narrative of racial stratification 
centering instead on ethnic group differences. 
II. COLORBLIND EQUALITY AND THE 
PRODUCTION OF RACIAL DIFFERENCE 
Even before deciding Fullilove, the Supreme Court had begun to 
retreat from the presumption of racial proportionality. Beginning in the 
late 1970s, that presumption was displaced by a starkly contrasting 
model of how social and economic goods would be distributed in a 
74. H.R. Rep. No. 94-468, at 1-2 (1975). 
75. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 465 (1980) (emphasis added). 
76. ld. at 478. 
77. ld. 
78. In dissent, Justice Stevens objected explicitly to a "random distribution of benefits on racial 
lines" serving as a baseline nonn that justified a pennanent scheme of "special privileges." [d. at 539. 
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world without racial discrimination. Under that model, the racial 
statistics that earlier had proved so compelling were sapped of legal 
meaning. Courts increasingly interpreted racial underrepresentation as 
evidence not of discrimination, or as a warrant for a race-conscious 
remedy, but rather as a manifestation of the underrepresented group's 
disinclination to obtain its share of the goods in question. In dialogue 
with influential social scientists and political journalists, the Supreme 
Court reconstructed African Americans from a class characterized, for 
the purpose of civil rights enforcement, by the systematic subordination 
endured by its members, to a class characterized by its ethnic 
distinctiveness. In so doing, it recast conspicuous racial inequality from 
an evil in and of itself, to a morally benign legal irrelevancy. This Part 
examines this conceptual transformation, and argues that it formed an 
essential theoretical premise for the retrenchment of antidiscrimination 
law. 
A. Racial Inequality in a "Nation of Minorities": 
The Ethnicity Critique of Racial Proportionality 
The Supreme Court's 1978 opinion in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke79 is a seminal document in the reconstruction of 
racial inequality as ethnic difference. As the Court's first review of an 
affirmative action program, Bakke immediately became a legal and 
rhetorical touchstone in the debate over both race-conscious university 
admissions and the meaning of racial equality more broadly. The 
opinion of the Court was authored by Justice Powell, who wrote only for 
himself. It held that the University of California at Davis Medical 
School's admissions policy reserving sixteen of its 100 positions for 
minority applicants was unconstitutional because it denied to non-
minority applicants the opportunity to compete for all 100 positions, on 
account of their race.80 Most importantly for the future of affirmative 
action, five Justices agreed that even "benign" (as opposed to 
"invidious") racial classifications should be subjected to strict 
constitutional scrutiny. 81 
79. 438 U.s. 265 (1978). 
80. ld. at 319-20. 
81. ld. at 299. Justice Stevens' concurring opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Burger 
and Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue, but joined 
Justice Powell in striking down the admissions system on the ground that it violated Title IV. ld. at 421. 
The principle dissent, authored by Justice Brennan and joined by Justices Marshall, White and 
Blackmun, contended that benign racial preferences should be subject to intermediate, rather than strict, 
scrutiny, and concluded that under that standard of review the admissions system should have been 
upheld. ld. at 359. 
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Justice Powell's primary analytical challenge was to justify why 
racial classifications that burdened white males such plaintiff Allan 
Bakke should be scrutinized as closely as those that burdened "discrete 
and insular minorities. ,,82 The discourse of ethnic diversity served as the 
rhetorical lynchpin of Powell's argument. Since the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, he reasoned, the "United States has become a 
nation of minorities. Each had to struggle-and to some extent struggles 
still-to overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but of a 
'majority' composed of various minority groups.,,83 This proliferation 
of ethnic groups, Powell reasoned, was incompatible with the "artificial 
line of a two-class theory of the Fourteenth Amendment.,,84 The 
decision adopted in its place a universalist application of the Equal 
Protection Clause that was more "responsive to the racial, ethnic, and 
cultural diversity of the Nation.,,85 
This new democratization of equal protection, however, rendered 
impossible the task of calibrating judicial scrutiny to the specific status 
of the racial or ethnic minority burdened by a particular classification. 
Powell explained: 
The concepts of "majority" and "minority" necessarily reflect temporary 
arrangements and political judgments. . .. [T]he white "majority" itself is 
composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a 
history of Erior discrimination at the hands of the State and private 
individuals. 6 
Such an arrangement left courts with "no principled basis for deciding 
which groups would merit 'heightened judicial solicitude' and which 
would not. ,,87 
For Powell, to vary judicial scrutiny according to the identity of the 
burdened group was both conceptually incoherent and administratively 
unmanageable. Cognizable categories of difference had so proliferated 
since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, he argued, that it was 
impossible to draw a meaningful distinction between some amorphous 
racial or ethnic "majority," and "minorities" whose vulnerability at the 
hands of the majority warranted heightened "solicitude." The proper 
82. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144,152 n.4 (1938). 
83. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 292. 
84. ld. at 295. 
85. ld. at 293. 
86. ld. at 295. As Cheryl Harris writes of Bakke, "social constructionist accounts of race [were] 
conscripted into the argument that race and racial consciousness cannot be taken into account by the 
state .... Through Powell's partial engagement with the idea that the natural is produced by the social, 
race is deconstructed into a category too incoherent to fonn the basis of any remedial strategy." Harris, 
supra note I 0, at 1772. 
87. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296. 
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solution was to "protect" all groups equally. Powel thus justified the 
application of strict scrutiny to classifications that burdened white males 
as the logical extension of a long line of Supreme Court decisions 
holding that various national and ethnic groups enjoyed heightened 
constitutional protection.88 
Under Powell's theory, there existed no legally relevant connection 
between the present-day disadvantages of particular "ethnic" groups, 
and those groups' historical experiences of discrimination. Present 
disadvantage appears, not as an aberration in Bakke, but as a normal 
stage in a given group's hard-fought ascendancy toward the American 
socioeconomic mainstream. Accordingly, racial inequality represents 
less a pernicious vestige of past oppression than an instance of benign 
ethnic variation that will work itself out over time. Powell's rendering 
of racial inequality as mere ethnic difference marked a key analytical 
move in the Court's reconstruction of the Constitution's equal protection 
mandate, from that of protecting vulnerable minorities to insuring the 
state's neutrality toward formally equal individuals.89 
Yet if ethnicity theory provided the rhetorical basis of Powell's case 
for strict scrutiny, it was also indispensable to his qualified defense of 
race-conscious admissions. Powell's opinion first validated the diversity 
rationale for affirmative action. Student body diversity was vital to 
"[t]he atmosphere of speculation, experiment and creation[,] so essential 
to the quality of higher education," he reasoned. Because "the nation's 
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the ideas 
and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples,,,90 
Powell concluded, "the attainment of a diverse student body" qualified 
as a compelling state purpose.91 
It is important to note what Justice Powell did not say: that student 
body diversity-the exclusive constitutionally permissible state purpose 
for race-conscious admissions-had anything to do with remedying past 
discrimination, or even with racial equality. Rather, a state's interest in 
"select[ing] those students who will contribute the most to the robust 
exchange of ideas,,92 resided in a university's "academic freedom," 
which, "though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long 
has been valued as a special concern of the First Amendment.,,93 
88. See id. at 292. 
89. For an infonnative account of this trajectory, see Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 
YALE L.J. 427 (1997). 
90. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13. 
91. Id. at 311. 
92. Id.at313. 
93. Id. at 312-13. 
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Remarkably, the diversity rationale satisfied strict constitutional scrutiny 
not because it served the values or aspirations embodied in the Equal 
Protection Clause, but rather in spite of the Court's equal protection 
review. For constitutional purposes, the "beneficiaries" of race-
conscious admissions were not the minority students who, but for their 
projected contribution to student body diversity, would not have been 
admitted, but rather the (overwhelmingly white) student body as a 
whole, particularly the "future leaders" who might otherwise have been 
deprived of exposure to the nation's "many peoples." 
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke has shaped the American political 
and constitutional conversation about affirmation for nearly thirty years. 
One need look no further than the majority opinion in Grutter,94 or the 
enshrinement of the value of "diversity" in corporate America,95 to 
appreciate the triumph of the diversity paradigm of racial integration. 
The enduring force of Justice Powell's opinion resides less in its legal 
reasoning per se, that in its specific mode of accounting for racial 
inequality. In particular, it presented inequality in terms that resonated 
with antiracist understandings of race and racial difference. Justice 
Powell's insistence on the historical and cultural-as opposed to the 
natural or genetic-distinctions between social groups shared a great 
deal with the antiracist rebuke of discrimination advanced by 
generations of civil rights activists.96 Just as importantly, his celebration 
of ethnic difference meshed rhetorically with the fledgling discourse of 
multi cuI turalism. 97 
Justice Powell's carefully calibrated approach to racial inequality was 
heavily informed by-and, in tum, dramatically amplified the 
intellectual impact of-a burgeoning body of social scientific literature 
94. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329-30 (ostensibly repUdiating the constitutional 
relevance of either past discrimination or of racial proportionality, while endorsing the importance of 
achieving student body diversity). See infra discussion at Part III.C. 
95. See Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management: 
Employer Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961-1996, in COLOR LINES, supra note 30, at 87-117 
(describing the professionalization of "diversity management" within corporate human resources 
departments). 
96. Michael ami and Howard Winant explain that the "ethnicity paradigm" approach to race 
passed through two major stages before it was taken up for the "conservative egalitarian" ends at issue 
in this Article: "a pre-1930s stage in which the ethnic group view was an insurgent approach, 
challenging the biologistic (and at least implicitly racist) view ofrace which was dominant at that time; 
a 1930s to 1965 stage during which the paradigm operated as the progressive/liberal 'common sense' 
approach to race, and during which two recurrent themes-assimilationism and cultural pluralism-
were defined." aMI & WINANT, supra note 5, at 14. 
97. See DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM 101 
(1995) (discussing the triumph in late-twentieth-century America of the muIticulturalist "doctrine" that 
"the United States ought to sustain rather than diminish a great variety of distinctive cultures carried by 
ethno-racial groups"). 
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on ethnicity. Its most influential author was the Harvard sociologist 
Nathan Glazer. Powell adapted much of the language of the Bakke 
opinion, including its rationale for subjecting the Davis program to strict 
scrutiny, directly from Glazer's account of American ethnic dynamics. 
"We are indeed a nation of minorities," Glazer wrote in his influential 
1975 book, Affirmative Discrimination, and "to enshrine some 
minorities as deserving of special benefits means not to defend minority 
rights against a discriminating majority but to favor some of these 
minorities over others.,,98 
From the perspective of antidiscrimination law, Glazer's key 
achievement was simultaneously to acknowledge, and even celebrate, 
that ethnic difference was a principle feature of American social 
organization, and yet deny that conspicuous, group-salient inequality 
carried any moral or legal significance. Although the "ethnic group is 
one of the building blocks of American society, politics, and economy, 
none of which can be fully understood without reference to ethnic group 
formation and maintenance," Glazer wrote, "this type of group is not 
given any political recognition or formal status.,,99 "If one could draw a 
neat line between those who have suffered from discrimination and 
those who have not, the matter would be simpler," Glazer explained. lOo 
But most "immigrant groups have had periods in which they were 
discriminated against. For the Irish and the Jews, for example, these 
periods lasted a long time."lol The fact that such groups eventually 
succeeded, Glazer concluded, counseled that the racial and ethnic 
categories adopted by advocates of affirmative action "neither properly 
group individuals who deserve redress on the basis of past 
discriminatory treatment, nor properly group individuals who deserve 
redress on the basis of a present deprived condition."lo2 
By invoking the example of socioeconomically "assimilated" 
immigrant groups, Glazer's "nation-of-minorities" model fused 
rhetorically with the popular narrative of the timeless immigrant struggle 
to overcome discrimination and ascend the socioeconomic hierarchy. 
Implicitly, today's disadvantaged minorities would, or at least should, 
struggle to overcome their legacy of discrimination and disadvantage, 
just as their discriminated-against and disadvantaged predecessors did. 
Further, those predecessors, who through hard work and assimilation 
98. NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 
201 (1975). 
99. [d. at 28. 
100. !d. at 198. 
101. [d. 
102. [d. at 200. 
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had earned their place in the present "majority," could not justly be 
asked to "bear the burden of redressing a past in which they had no or 
little part, or assisting those who presently receive more assistance than 
they did.,,103 To require them to do so would be to favor one minority 
over another. 
Glazer's formulation denied that past discrimination could adequately 
account for present racial inequality. And if decoupling present-day 
inequality from history seems implausible with respect to a group--
African Americans-characterized by centuries of unrelenting caste-like 
subordination, that is where the idea of race-as-ethnicity becomes so 
rhetorically critical. As Robert Gordon observes, colorblindness 
proponents assimilated blacks into the immigrant model of ethnic group 
progress "by imagining 1964 as the date of their 'arrival': once released 
from legal disabilities, blacks have since been free to compete on equal 
terms." 104 
The rhetorical effect of the blacks-as-American-ethnics story is 
twofold. First, it suggests that African Americans will follow a path of 
ethnic progress comparable to that of their immigrant forebears-the 
Irish, eastern European Jews, Italians, Japanese, and the like. Second, it 
accounts for racial inequality as an expression of ethnically distinctive 
culture or taste. Racial inequality is thus tolerable because it is 
temporary and bound to be diminished with each generation; but even if 
it persists, it is merely a natural manifestation of black ethnic difference. 
Under this model, the goals of the civil rights movement have already 
been satisfied, notwithstanding apparent evidence to the contrary; all 
that remains for antidiscrimination law is to police against the isolated, 
exceptional acts of illicit discrimination perpetrated by a handful of 
racist throw-backs to the Jim Crow era. 
For an opinion that formally represented the view of only one Justice, 
Bakke proved enormously influential, both doctrinally and in its framing 
of the broader national conversation about the meaning of racial 
inequality. It bears emphasis that there is nothing inherently invidious 
about reconceptualizing race in terms of ethnic difference. Indeed, as I 
suggested above, that impulse shares a great deal with, and draws 
rhetorical force from, the antiracist discourses of civil rights and 
multiculturalism. 105 As it was deployed by colorblindness advocates, 
however, the reconstruction of racial inequality as ethnic difference was 
103. Id. at 20 I. 
104. Robert W. Gordon, Undoing Historical Injustice, in JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY 52 (Austin Sarat & Thomas B. Kearns eds., 1996). 
105. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97. 
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analytically critical to the mounting critique of affirmative action106 and 
to the ascendancy of the colorblindness model more broadly. 
Regardless of its historical origins or the political sympathies of its 
propagators, the idea of black ethnicity has gone a long way toward 
naturalizing racial inequality. 
B. Equality as Colorblind Competition 
By naturalizing conspicuous racial inequality, the ethnicity critique of 
racial proportionality helped to legitimize the idea that individual 
competition in a colorblind marketplace produced a just allocation of 
social and economic goods. In a highly influential article in the Harvard 
Law Review, which drew liberally from the work of Glazer and other 
ethnicity theorists, Morris Abram succinctly encapsulated this 
quintessentially American notion of equality: 
The American system guarantees civil and political rights-but it does 
not guarantee those social and economic rights described in the United 
Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights.... Despite its 
inevitable inequities, the free market system-also a traditional element 
of American society-has provided most of our citizens with living 
standards that are among the highest in the world. As fair shakers 
[proponents of colorblindness] see it, removing all barriers to the exercise 
of civil and political rights and an individual's ability to particisate in the 
free market system is the best possible way to promote justice. I 7 
106. On the heels of the opinion, the "nation-of-minorities" model became a ubiquitous feature of 
popular discourse on affirmative action. See, e.g., The Court's Affirmative Action, THE NEW REpUBLIC, 
Feb. 8, 1978, at 8 (Justice Powell's nation-of-minorities analysis "struck a blow to the practice of 
"dispensing society's favors" in a way that "encourages this unsavory, competitive aspect of 
groupthink."); William 1. Bennett & Terry Eastland, Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination: I, 
COMMENT., Sept. 1978, at 31 (Justice Powell's analysis rightly demonstrated that there "is no principled 
basis ... for deciding which groups would merit heightened judicial solicitude and which would not."). 
Glazer himself hailed Powell's opinion as "a more sophisticated and complex position on the ethnic 
character of the United States than I have seen before in any opinion of the Supreme Court." Nathan 
Glazer, Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination: 2 COMMENT. Sept. 1978, at 36, 38. Powell had 
powerfully "attacked the theory that only stigmatized groups, groups thought inferior, deserve the 
protection of the Constitution"-a theory that was "remarkably dangerous in a world in which 
economically and educationally successful minorities have met ... the fiercest discrimination .... " Id. 
at 38. 
107. Abram, supra. note 19, at 1326. In an insightful critique of the Fifth Circuit's decision in 
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th 1996) (striking down as unconstitutional the University of Texas 
Law School's affirmative action program), Reva Siegel notes the striking parallels between Abram's 
contention that the American legal system "guarantees civil and political rights" but not "social and 
economic rights," and the rights regime under Plessy v. Ferguson, 136 U.S. 537 (\896). Siegel, Racial 
Rhetorics, supra note 10, at 53. During the Reconstruction era, Siegel writes, "overtly hierarchical 
discourses of racial status were gradually translated into a rhetoric of privacy and associational liberty 
concerned with projecting racial status relations from governmental interference." Id. at 52. Any race-
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Far from disavowing equality, for Abram and 
marketplace operationalized the best ideals 
movement. 108 
others the colorblind 
of the civil rights 
Ethnicity discourse, in tum, helped to reconcile the colorblind 
marketplace with perpetual, conspicuous racial inequality. Glazer, for 
example, celebrated what he called the "Northern model" of ethnic 
group relations: 
There are many groups. They differ in wealth, power, occupation, values, 
but in effect an open society prevails for individuals and for groups. Over 
time a substantial and rough equalization of wealth and power can be 
hoped for ... , and each group participates sufficiently in the goods and 
values and social life of a common society so that all can accept the 
common society as good and fair. 109 
Under this model, a particular ethnic group's inferior status reflected not 
the historical legacy of discrimination, but rather the aggregate 
achievement of individual group members in the competitive 
marketplace of education and employment. As the economist Glenn 
Loury put it, implicit in the system of colorblind opportunity "is a 
perception of Americans as ... a decent and generous people, believing 
in fair play and ... ready to welcome individuals of all races and creeds 
to make of their freedom what they will.,,11O It was race-conscious 
public policy, rather than the racially unequal distribution of social and 
economic goods, that most offended America's fundamental principles 
of equality. The essential premise of the colorblind marketplace theory 
of equality was that market-rational decisionmaking and free 
competition among individuals were logically incommensurate with 
anything that the law--or common sense, for that matter-should 
register as discrimination, inequality, or injustice. I I I 
salient distributive effects of market competition occupy "a private sphere of racial differentiation that 
civil rights law may not aspire to disestablish." Id. at 57. 
108. Glazer articulated the frequently repeated sentiment that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "could 
only be read as instituting into law judge Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: 'Our 
Constitution is color-blind.'" GLAZER, supra note 98, at 44. In their path-breaking 1975 book on 
American ethnicity, Glazer and Daniel Moynihan similarly insisted that the "Civil Rights Act of 1964 
was the very embodiment of the liberal expectancy. . .. In particular, government was to be color 
blind." Nathan Glazer & Daniel Moynihan, Introduction, in ETHNICITY: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE 10 
(Nathan Glazer & Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1975). 
109. Nathan Glazer, Ethnicity-North, South, West, COMMENT., May 1982, at 73 (quoting 
NATHAN GLAZER AND DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT (1963)). 
110. Glenn C. Loury, Who Speaksfor American Blacks?, COMMENT., Jan. 1987, at 34,35. 
I I I. The Supreme Court likewise invoked colorblind competition as an irreducible touchstone of 
equality. In Bakke, for example, it was not Davis' racial preference per se that Justice Powell found to 
have offended the principle of equal protection, but rather the fact that non-minority applicants were 
"totally foreclosed from competition for the 16 special admissions seats in every [mJedical [sJchool 
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1. Market Outcomes as a Register of Racial Difference 
The colorblind marketplace conception of equality rested on a 
shallowly submerged and jarringly paradoxical understanding of race. 
On the one hand, its proponents argued that by disavowing all forms of 
race-consciousness, colorblindness affirmed the moral irrelevance of 
race and honored the value of individual achievement within a theater of 
equal opportunity. When confronted with the fact that the competitive 
colorblind meritocracy appeared to reproduce existing patterns of racial 
inequality, however, they embraced accounts of racial difference that in 
effect rationalized those patterns. The coherence of the colorblindness 
model thus depended directly, if subtly, on a theory of racial 
difference. I 12 My claim is not that colorblindness advocates' 
simultaneous adoption of inconsistent, even contradictory, discourses of 
race represented a cynical, opportunistic rhetorical strategy. For some, 
of course, that may well have been the case. I suspect that many, 
however, were entirely unaware of the tension. Rather, the paradox has 
been a logical consequence of superimposing the colorblindness model 
onto a society characterized by severe, entrenched racial inequality. 
If the colorblind marketplace functions as its proponents believe-as 
a competitive meritocracy that justly distributes rewards according to 
individual desert-it requires only a short logical step to infer that its 
outcomes accurately register the relative talent, effort, skill, or merit of 
the individual competitors. In a pure liberal meritocracy, the colorblind 
marketplace thus operates as a testing ground of individuals, a neutral 
arbiter of ability and desert, where variations in outcome measure pre-
existing differences. 113 Where outcomes form racially or ethnically 
discernable patterns, those patterns accordingly manifest the real 
differences between groups. Following this logic, the competitive 
colorblind meritocracy may well perpetuate racial inequality, but that 
class." Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978). "Fairness in individual 
competition for opportunities, especially those provided by the State," he explained, "is a widely 
cherished American ethic." /d. at 319 n.53. Indeed, Powell reiterated the point throughout the opinion. 
112. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
113. See. e.g., Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation 
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988). In the neoconservative 
world view of colorblindness proponents, Crenshaw argues, competition for employment, "[u]nimpeded 
by irrational prejudice against identifiable groups and unfettered by government-imposed 
preferences, ... would ensure that any group stratification would reflect only the cumulative effects of 
employers' rational decisions to hire the best workers for the least cost." /d. at 1344-45. Further, 
"[r]ace consciousness ... reinforces whites' sense that American society is really meritocratic and thus 
helps prevent them from questioning the basic legitimacy of the free market. Believing both that Blacks 
are inferior and that the economy impartially rewards the superior over the inferior, whites see that most 
Blacks are, indeed worse off than whites are, which reinforces their sense that the market is operating 
'fairly and impartially'; those who should logically be on the bottom are on the bottom." ld. at 1380. 
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fact does not impugn its fundamental justice. 
Rather, racial inequality simply manifests ethnic differences. Glazer, 
for example, has defended group stratification as an affirmation of 
ethnic traditions. "Racial and ethnic communities have expressed 
themselves in occupations and work groups," he wrote. I 14 
Distinctive histories have channeled ethnic and racial groups into one 
kind of work or another, and this is the origin of many of the 
'unrepresentative' work distributions we see. These distributions have 
been maintained by an occupational tradition linked to an ethnic 
community, which makes it easier for the Irish to become policemen, the 
Italians fruit dealers, Jews businessmen. I 15 
And, one might add, blacks janitors, maids, and other low-wage service 
employees. Glazer's somewhat romantic formulation acknowledges the 
role of history in "channeling" groups into different strata of the 
occupational hierarchy but denies that past any moral or legal meaning 
for the present. 
The economist Thomas Sowell inferred a similar lesson from the 
tendency in "multi-ethnic societies ... for ethnic groups to engage in 
different occupations, have different levels ... of education, receive 
different incomes and occupy different placer s] in the social 
hierarchy.,,116 Notwithstanding this basic truth, he scolded, advocates of 
affirmative action regarded this "universality" as an "anomaly.,,117 The 
present disadvantages borne by historically subordinated groups 
reflected not the legacy of public and private discrimination, Sowell 
explained, but rather the disposition of those groups to engage in 
"different" occupations. 118 "One of the more intangible-but very 
important--differences among groups ... has to do with culture, 
tradition, values, and work skills.,,119 Group tastes were embedded in 
deep, inherited cultural values, he argued. 
114. GLAZER, supra note 98, at 203 (emphasis added). 
115. GLAZER, supra note 98, at 203 (emphasis added). Constitutional scholar Paul Brest invoked 
Glazer's ethnic expression argument in his widely influential defense of procedural colorblindness. 
"Not all racially disproportionate impact[s]," Brest instructed, "can be attributed to past and remote 
discrimination: culture and social environment play major roles in shaping people's motivations, habits, 
and skills, and the values voluntarily held by different social groups conduce to differing extents to 
success on tests and jobs in any society." Paul Brest, Foreward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination 
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1,32 (1976). 
116. Thomas Sowell, "Affirmative Action "; A Worldwide Disaster, COMMENT., Dec. 1989, at 21, 
23. 
117. Id. 
118. !d. 
119. Id. at 23. 
2006] ANTIDISCRIMINATION & RACIAL INEQUALITY 119 
[A]ttitudes were brought over from Europe. . .. American society had 
given the Irish (who arrived earlier) more education that it had to the 
Jews, but centuries of tradition in Europe had produced very different 
attitudes toward education in the two groups. "Society" in the United 
States is not the cause of all American social phenomena. 120 
Accordingly, not every expression of inequality warranted a government 
remedy. 
By denying redress for the effects of past discrimination, 
antidiscrimination law thus affirmed the integrity of ethnic tradition and 
group self-determination. Whether racial inequality was rationalized in 
terms of cultural traditions, the relative adherence to social norms, or 
outright cultural "pathology,,,121 the effect was to reify an ascribed set of 
values and attitudes as an essential, constitutive aspect of a group. To 
the extent that the "cultural" attributes bearing on a group's relative 
social and economic status were connected to the uniqueness of its 
history, it was not the history of discrimination against the group that 
mattered. Nor did the group differences made visible by the process of 
colorblind competition correspond with the conventional markers of 
"ethnicity"-for example, distinctiveness in language, religious practice, 
social and political experience, family structure, or cuisine-that are 
typically celebrated for their contribution to "diversity." Rather, the 
differences that mattered were those that set in relief a given group's 
competitive shortcomings in the colorblind marketplace. 122 Through 
120. Thomas Sowell, Myths about Minorities, COMMENT., Aug. 1979, at 33, 36. Glazer and 
Moynihan put a somewhat more provocative gloss on a similar point. "Men are not equal," they 
explained; "neither are ethnic groups.... [M]en everywhere [are] ranked in systems of social 
stratification, where one person is better or worse off than another. This is the empirical fact. As with 
individuals, so with groups of individuals, with social groups defined by ethnic identity." For both 
ethnic groups and for individuals, inequality "arises from differential success in achieving social 
norms." GLAZER & MOYNIHAN, supra note \09, at 108. Nor did those employing the trope of ethnic 
taste pursue the possibility that some ethnic "traditions" and "preferences" may have been forged in the 
context of highly circumscribed opportunities. Contrary to the urgings of Glazer and Sowell, it does not 
follow that antidiscrimination law should presume that such preferences are unproblematically 
autonomous and deserving of automatic deference. As Cass Sunstein observes, "a social or legal system 
that has produced preferences, and has done so by limiting opportunities unjustly ... can hardly justify 
itself by reference to existing preferences." Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 
2410, 2420 (1994). See also Charles R. Lawrence 1II, The !d, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 318,375 (1987) ("Culturalist" accounts of 
"black inferiority" tend to deny that that race-salient traits are the "result of societal discrimination."). 
121. See GLAZER, supra note 98, at 72 (characterizing blacks' differential adherence to social 
norms as an inexplicable "tangle of pathology"). 
122. For some colorblindness advocates, competitive failure in the colorblind marketplace not 
only evidenced the functional differences between the "cultures" of different ethnic groups, but also 
inspired explicitly neo-racialist explanations of socioeconomic stratification. Drawing on Arthur 
Jensen's widely influential 1969 article, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement," 
Richard Herrnstein, the future co-author (with Charles Murray) of The Bell Curve, alerted would-be 
advocates of racial proportionality to blacks' low relative performance on IQ tests. R.J. Herrnstein, In 
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this logic, the colorblind meritocracy functioned as a presumptive 
register of racial difference. 123 
2. "Social Engineering" 
In keeping with the view that ethnic inequality was natural, inevitable, 
and benign, colorblindness proponents dubbed those who would disturb 
the meritocracy of the colorblind marketplace "social engineers." The 
term appears to have been coined by Morris Abram in his 1986 essay,124 
but the underlying sentiment has been around as long as affirmative 
action itself. The word "engineering" conjures up a host of associations: 
of construction, or fabrication; of manmade-ness; of altering the natural 
order of things for human purposes. It stands in jarring proximity to the 
idea of the "social," that distinctly non-governmental realm of human 
experience, apart from the public arena of politics, law and regulation. 
"Social engineering" invoked, as Abram no doubt intended, something 
decidedly unnatural. 
According to colorblindness proponents, social engineers threatened 
to disturb a perfectly normal, morally unproblematic pattern of ethnic 
variation. In their effort to "bring about proportional representation in 
short order,,,125 Abram explained, the "social engineers thus defy the 
existing distribution of skills and abilities-whether naturally present or 
socially developed-in order to achieve their objective.,,126 In language 
remarkably reminiscent of the bifurcation of "social" and "political" 
rights under the Plessy regime,127 Abram lamented that a "large segment 
Defense of Intelligence Tests, COMMENT. Feb. 1980, at 40. Jensen had demonstrated that "[b]iology 
seemed more often than not to undermine political and moral ideals. Biology creates inequalities .... " 
Id. at 41. "Substantial heritabilities are like large unseen rocks in the stream of social life," Herrnstein 
announced, "shaping and at times distorting the effects of institutions and laws defining private 
relationships .... " Id. at 43. "The time has come to look closely at the facts and to see what they 
suggest about the possibilities for ethnic fairness in our society," Herrnstein urged. Id. at 49. 
123. This logic of racial reproduction bears on what a number of scholars have characterized as 
the "stigmatic" harm that underrepresentation inflicts on minorities. As Kenneth Karst observed in 
1977, "[a] legislature oblivious to ... [the] stigma of [racial] caste will nonetheless reinforce the stigma 
when it produces racially discriminatory effects through ostensibly 'neutral' legislation." Karst, supra 
note 4, at 51. Such stigmatic harm flows specifically from the "pattern of denials which resonate or 
reverberate throughout American society, all tending to declare minorities inferior or limited to a certain 
place." Jones, supra note 62, at 2355. 
124. See Abram, supra note 19. The phrase itself has enjoyed remarkable success in popular 
political discourse, finding its way into the lexicons even of some supporters of affirmative action. See, 
e.g., Michael Kinsley, Class. not Race, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 19, 1991 at 4 ("[A]ffirmative action 
by social class is still a form of zero-sum social engineering .... "). 
125. Abram, supra note 19, at 1313. 
126. Id. at 1320. 
127. See Siegel, Racial Rhetorics, supra note 10. 
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of the civil rights lobby has turned from the struggle for equality in civil 
and political rights to the advocacy of redistribution of economic and 
social rights.,,128 Political journalist Carl Cohen extended Abram's 
critique, characterizing the pursuit of racial proportionality as an offense 
to the quintessential American value of ethnic pluralism: 
[The notion of racial "underrepresentation"] relies on the seriously 
mistaken assumption that, absent discrimination, all ethnic groups would 
be randomly distributed among all categories of employment. . .. A just 
society, on this view, will be a homogenized society. . . . [H]aving 
confounded equal treatment with proportionality, [s]tatistical 
"underrepresentation" thus becomes the warrant for racially preferential 
instruments to set things right. . .. Human beings commonly work and 
play, live and study, with fellow members of groups-religious, racial, 
national-with which they most closely identify themselves. Ethnic 
clumps [are! the natural product of what we regard with pride as "cultural 
pluralism.,,1 9 
Bakke's diversity rationale had come full circle, in an ethnic pluralism 
defense of racial inequality. To pursue the racial integration of lucrative, 
high-status social and economic institutions constituted, under this view, 
an attempt to "homogenize" our celebrated "nation of minorities." 
Sowell, in particular, attacked social engineers' practice of inferring 
the relative magnitude of past discrimination against a given group from 
that group's present socioeconomic status. Sowell strictly denied that 
"the economic and other problems of ethnic groups actually vary with 
the frequency or severity of the sins against them.,,130 "Today's grand 
fallacy about race and ethnicity," he wrote, "is that the statistical 
'representation' of a group--in jobs, schools, etc.-shows and measures 
discrimination.,,131 Rather, the relative "success" of some ethnic groups 
in overcoming histories of discrimination conclusively debunked the 
presumption of racial proportionality. "The history of the Jews, 
Orientals, and other ethnic groups," he argued, "is relevant and fatally 
undermines [the] presupposition[]" that past discrimination is the cause 
of present racial inequality. 132 "Why one group does better 
economically than another IS a complex question," Sowell 
128. Abram, supra note 19, at 1325. Abram liberally cited Sowell and Glazer's ethnicity oriented 
defenses of racial stratification. See, e.g., id. at 1316 (Sowell has shown that "[g]roups such as the 
Japanese, Chinese, and West Indian blacks have fared very well in American society despite racial bias 
against these groups. "). 
129. Carl Cohen, Naked Racial Preferences, COMMENT., Mar 1986, at 24,29 (emphasis added). 
130. Sowell, supra note 120, at 34. 
131. Thomas Sowell, Are Quotas Goodfor Blacks?, COMMENT., June 1978, at 39, 39. 
132. Thomas Sowell, Weber and Bakke, and the Presuppositions of "Affirmative Action," 26 
WAYNE L. REv. 1309, 1318(1980). 
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acknowledged, "[b]ut the presence of Jews and Japanese at the top of the 
income ladder among American ethnic groups is strong evidence that 
prejudice or discrimination alone is hardly a sufficient explanation.,,133 
Still more worrisome for Sowell, it was only a "short step" from the 
eagerness of some Supreme Court Justices to interpret "group disparities 
in 'representation' ... as proof of societal discrimination," to "the idea 
of restoring groups to where they would have been-and what they 
would have been-but for the offending discrimination.,,134 The 
presumption that, but for past discrimination, blacks would enjoy 
economic and educational benefits roughly in proportion to their 
membership in the population was pure hubris, Sowell believed. Judges 
might as well ask: 
What would the average Englishman be like today "but for" the Norman 
conquest? What would the average Japanese be like today "but for" the 
enforced isolation of Japan for two-and-a-half centuries under the 
Tokugawa shoguns? What would the Middle East be like today "but for" 
the emergence ofIslam?135 
To presume that, were it not for the legacy of slavery and a century of 
caste-like discrimination in employment, education, and housing, 
American blacks would enjoy rough socioeconomic equality with 
whites, involved an equally improbable act of speculation. As Sowell 
put it, the "moral uniqueness of black history does not imply a causal 
uniqueness." 136 
Colorblindness proponents thus condemned government interference 
with the just rewards of open, meritocratic competition. "If, as seems 
more likely than not, occupational preferences and abilities are not 
randomly distributed across all racial and ethnic groups," argued then-
Professor Richard Posner, "then governmental intervention in the labor 
markets ... will have to continue forever if proportional equality in the 
desirable occupations is to be secured.,,137 Such an "intervention would, 
133. Sowell, supra note 120, at 35. See also, James Nuechterlein, A Farewell to Civil Rights, 
COMMENT., Aug. 1987, at 25, 35-36 (The history of "Orientals and Jews" in the United States 
demonstrates that "there is room in the interstices of American society for oppressed minority groups to 
make a place for themselves and begin the long ascent out of their oppressed status. Blacks, who have 
suffered quantitatively and qualitatively as no other groups in America has suffered, have nonetheless 
begun that ascent .... "). 
134. Sowell, supra note 116, at 26. 
135. Sowell, supra note 116, at 26. 
136. Sowell, supra note 132, at 1336. Terry Eastland and William Bennett similarly rejected the 
presumption that "in the absence of slavery and discrimination in American history blacks and other 
minorities would be 'naturally' represented today in the various walks of life in something like the 
statistical patterns they now recommend." TERRY EASTLAND & WILLIAM J. BENNETT, COUNTING BY 
RACE: EQUALITY FROM THE FOUNDING FATHERS TO BAKKE AND WEBER 144 (1979). 
137. Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of 
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by profoundly distorting the allocation of labor and by driving a wedge 
between individual merit and economic and professional success, greatly 
undermine the system of incentives on which a free society depends.,,138 
Against a background presumption that colorblind competition 
accurately registers individual merit, the government's pursuit of greater 
racial representation, rather than the reproduction of inequality under a 
colorblindness regime, disfigures the natural distributive order. 
To critics of racial proportionality, "social engineers" offended the 
true values of the civil rights movement and obstructed racial progress 
both by disregarding real racial differences and, paradoxically, by 
seeking to make race more, rather than less, relevant in American life. 
The moment the 1964 Act inscribed the colorblindness principle into 
law, Glazer complained, "[l]arger and larger areas of employment came 
under increasingly stringent controls so that each offer of a job, each 
promotion, each dismissal had to be considered in light of its effects on 
group ratios .... ,,139 When opponents of race-conscious public policy 
defended America's presumed colorblind meritocracy against 
preference-happy racial balancers, by contrast, they claimed to wear the 
authentic mantle of the Act. Only by scrupulously denying the moral 
and legal relevance of race, and insisting on a rigorously enforced 
colorblind meritocracy, could the shared goal of burying the nation's 
past sins be fulfilled. 140 
The social engineering argument, and the colorblindness critique of 
racial proportionality more generally, was embedded in a teleology of 
liberal progress that enabled the (declaredly) anti-racist civil egalitarians 
who populate the nation's political and judicial bodies to imagine that 
Brown and the passage of the 1964 Act marked a decisive triumph over 
the shameful, state-sanctioned racial status hierarchy of the past. The 
essence of this narrative, Robert Gordon explains, is that "slavery and 
Jim Crow were great historical injustices because they violated the 
historically established American basic norm of formally equal 
treatment of persons, or color blindness.,,141 Beginning with Brown and 
Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REv. I, 18. 
138. Id. 
139. GLAZER, supra note 98, at 31. 
140. Colorblindness advocates frequently argued that affinnative action dis served racial equality 
by stigmatizing the very people it was supposed to benefit. "A quota is a divider of society," Abram 
insisted, "a creator of castes, and it is all the worse for its racial base, especially in a society desperately 
striving for an equality that will make race irrelevant." Abram, supra note 19, at \322 (quoting BICKEL, 
THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975)). By openly snubbing the principle of colorblindness, he 
continued, "social engineers invite us to view people as statistics; they submerge personality, effort, and 
character under the blanket concerns of race, sex, and ethnicity." Id. 
141. Gordon, supra note \04, at 51. 
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culminating in with the 1964 Act, the nation entered "an irenic period of 
steady progress in race relations, in which one legal barrier after another 
fell to full legal citizenship and in which the irrationality of racism 
evaporated in the sunlight of modernity.,,142 The stakes of this narrative 
extend well beyond the constitutionality of race-conscious remedies. 
"Race in this country," writes Morton Horwitz, "has always stood as a 
constant reminder that each individual is not judged solely as an 
individual." 143 Americans are thus attracted to the colorblindness 
critique of racial proportionality "primarily in order to avoid having the 
issue of racial equality overflow its bounds and become involved with 
the cognate question of the legitimacy of social and economic 
equality.,,144 
The colorblindness critique of racial proportionality thus achieved a 
moral, political, and legal authority far greater than the sum of its 
component arguments. Its considerable appeal lay as much in what it 
encouraged its audience to believe about the quality of the American 
nation, as what it said specifically about race-conscious public policy. 
In short, the colorblindness model has enabled Americans to reconcile 
conspicuous, persistent racial inequality with an image of the United 
States as a fundamentally fair and just place, where people deserve what 
they get and get what they deserve. 
III. COLORBLIND COMPETITION, RACIAL DIFFERENCE, AND 
THE RETRENCHMENT OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
The colorblind marketplace vision of racial equality, reinforced by the 
adjunct discourses of ethnic difference and social engineering, was 
assimilated directly into the antidiscrimination reasoning of the Supreme 
Court. By the end of the 1980s, a majority of Justices had expressly 
disavowed the presumption of racial proportionality, as the Court 
remade both Title VII and equal protection jurisprudence in the image of 
the race-neutral competitive marketplace. 
A. Title VII: Disparate Impact and the Emergence of 
the Market Rationality Standard 
Recall from Part I that when the Supreme Court first recognized the 
disparate impact action in Griggs, it dethroned the intent requirement as 
an essential component of unlawful discrimination. As I argued, the 
142. Id. at 53. 
143. HOIwitz, supra note 8, at 609. 
144. Id. 
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underlying premise of disparate impact, and particularly of the Court's 
strict rendering of the "business necessity" standard, was that in the 
absence of past or present discrimination, truly meritorious employment 
practices would usually result in roughly proportionate representation. 145 
Title VII did not necessarily prohibit racially disproportionate results, 
but it subjected them to considerable scrutiny. Over the course of the 
1980s, as the Court's construction of Title VII increasingly reflected 
both the ethnicity critique of racial proportionality and the logic of the 
race-neutral marketplace more broadly, its earlier suspicion of racial 
underrepresentation evaporated. As a direct result, the Court supplanted 
the strict necessity rule with a far more deferential standard. 
The Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank 
and Trust146 signaled an emerging consensus among the Justices that the 
presumption of racial proportionality had no place in Title VII 
enforcement. On its face, Watson was a case about the technical 
requirements of the disparate impact action-the parties' respective 
evidentiary burdens; the degree of specificity with which plaintiffs were 
required to identify a challenged employment practice; and the 
applicability of disparate impact analysis to "non-objective" job-
selection criteria. Not incidentally, the decision also held in favor of the 
plaintiffs, and in a very narrow sense even expanded the application of 
disparate impact reasoning to "subjective" or "informal" employment 
practices, such as hiring or promotion decisions based on a candidate's 
job interview or personal rapport with an employer. 147 
Far more consequentially, however, Justice O'Connor's plurality 
opinion reduced dramatically the burden of defending against a disparate 
impact claim. First, the opinion held that simply demonstrating that an 
employer's hiring or promotions system produced a disparate racial 
impact was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 
Plaintiffs would now additionally be "responsible for isolating and 
identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly 
responsible for the observed statistical disparities.,,148 Next, the opinion 
shifted the evidentiary burden in the business necessity phase from the 
defendant to the plaintiff. Chief Justice Burger's holding in Griggs that 
a challenged practice must have a "manifest relationship to the 
employment in question" 149 for a defendant to escape liability, 
O'Connor wrote, had been wrongly interpreted to mean that once a 
145. See supra text accompanying notes 57-70. 
146. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
147. !d. at 989-91. 
148. ld. at 994. 
149. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971). 
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plaintiff made a prima facie showing of disparate racial impact "the 
ultimate burden of proof can be shifted to the defendant.,,150 In a 
remarkable construal of Supreme Court precedent, she announced that 
"the ultimate burden of proving that discrimination against a protected 
group has been caused by a specific employment practice remains with 
the plaintiff at all times.,,151 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 
plurality revised the business necessity standard to a degree that left it 
nearly unrecognizable. Employers would no longer be required to prove 
that a challenged practice was "necessary to safe and efficient job 
performance to survive a Title VII challenge.,,152 Drawing on the equal 
protection holding in Davis, Justice O'Connor announced that in order 
to show that a challenged practice was justified by business necessitY, a 
defendant needed only to produce "evidence that its employment 
practices are based on legitimate business reasons . ... ,,153 As long a 
defendant could make a plausible showing that the disputed practice 
served some legitimate business goal, the burden fell to the plaintiff to 
disprove the defendant's assertion-a weighty task, to say the least. 
Notwithstanding Watson's extensive, if analytically questionable, 
parsing of precedent, as well as its highly technical tone, the plurality 
opinion ultimately draws its rhetorical force less from Title VII's text or 
from caselaw than from the distinctly extra-legal discourses of ethnic 
difference and the race-neutral marketplace. The opinion expressly 
disavowed the presumption of racial proportionality underlying the 
earlier disparate impact cases. Justice O'Connor explained that it was 
"completely unrealistic to assume that unlawful discrimination is the 
sole cause of the people failing to gravitate to jobs and employers in 
accord with the laws of chance.,,154 There were, she conjectured, 
"myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the 
composition of their work forces.,,155 Although O'Connor would wait 
until the following Term, in City of Richmond v. Croson, to flesh out 
this reasoning, her formulation in Watson began to build into Title VII 
enforcement a key premise of the colorblindness critique of racial 
proportionality-that race-salient group differences, and not 
discrimination, were the most likely cause of the documented racial 
disparities. 
150. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 997 (1988). 
151. ld. 
152. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 at 331, n.14 (1977). 
153. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (emphasis added). 
154. ld. at 992 (emphasis added). 
155. ld. 
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The opinion simply presumes substantial racial variations in 
employment tastes and interests. The suggestion that racial groups 
gravitate differently imputes to the inequality an aura of ineluctability, 
or naturalness; yet it simultaneously suggests that the challenged 
disparity is a result of the collective choices of minority individuals. In 
either case, it resists any suggestion that the disparate impact at issue 
was attributable either to the effects of past discrimination or to ongoing 
structural barriers of the sort that concerned the Griggs Court. 
Somewhat paradoxically, the opinion invokes racial differences in the 
service of a doctrinal innovation-freeing the defendant of the burden of 
proving business necessity--<iesigned to minimize employers' legal 
obligation to notice race. 
As in the parallel constitutional controversy around affirmative 
action, the imputation of social engineering and the specter of racial 
"quotas" haunted the conflict over the business necessity defense. If 
defendants' evidentiary burden was set too high, and employers were 
obliged to satisfy a strict necessity standard, the plurality worried, 
"quotas and preferential treatment [would] become the only cost-
effective means of avoiding expensive litigation and potentially 
catastrophic liability.,,156 The extension of disparate impact analysis 
"into the context of subjective selection practices," in particular, risked 
encouraging employers to adopt such "inappropriate prophylactic 
measures,,,157 and thus to defy the pre-existing, racially differential 
distribution of employment tastes and interests. Watson advanced a 
moral argument against social engineering that intertwined the 
denunciation of racial quotas with culturally ascendant ideas about 
ethnic group difference. It was imperative for the Court to fashion 
evidentiary standards that operated as "adequate safeguards" against this 
looming hazard. 15s Accordingly, the Court eliminated liability where 
the challenged practice satisfied a merely legitimate business purpose. 
The new standard dramatically constricted the category of racially 
disparate impacts for which Title VII offered the possibility of redress. 
The Watson plurality's discouragement of racial quotas was 
inseparable from its determination to preserve employers' traditional 
managerial prerogatives. Disparate impact theory had held such far-
reaching implications because it construed Title VII to prohibit some 
employment practices in spite a/their instrumental rationality.159 This is 
156. Jd. at 993. 
157. [d. at 992. 
158. [d. at 993. 
159. Christine 1011s explains that in this respect disparate impact liability sometimes operates as an 
accommodation requirement: "Employers are often required by disparate impact law to incur special 
128 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 75 
precisely what concerned the plurality, which worried repeatedly that the 
imposition of a strict necessity standard might have a "chilling effect on 
legitimate business practices.,,160 Whenever possible courts should defer 
to employers' right to engage in what they believed were rational 
business practices,161 Justice O'Connor reasoned. Requiring disparate 
impact plaintiffs to carry a heavy evidentiary burden would thus help to 
ensure that Title VII did not give would-be defendants "incentives to 
modify any normal and legitimate practices by introducing quotas or 
preferential treatment.,,162 When called on to evaluate whether a 
"discretionary employment practice[] [is] insufficiently related to 
legitimate business purposes,,,163 courts should therefore conduct 
something akin to a rational basis review in an equal protection 
challenge. Business rationality was incommensurate with anything that 
either the law or common sense could properly understand as 
"discriminati on. " 
Watson's strong deference to practices that merely serve an 
employer's "legitimate business goals" begs the question of what sorts 
of practices might expose an employer to disparate impact liability. 
What would constitute an illegitimate business goal? Presumably, such 
a practice would be one calculated to disqualify minority candidates at a 
disproportionately high rate instead of, or at least in addition to, 
achieving the employer's legitimate business aims. By crediting what 
amounts to a "market-made-me-do-it" defense, Watson's new, 
substantially more deferential business necessity standard thus looked 
much like a test for discriminatory intent. Justice Blackmun stated as 
much in his concurring opinion, observing that the rule announced by 
the plurality "bears a closer resemblance to the allocation of burdens we 
established for disparate-treatment claims .... ,,164 The procedural and 
costs in response to the distinctive needs or circumstances ... of particular groups, and these 
requirements may arise in situations in which the employer had no intention of treating the group 
differently on the basis of group membership." Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 
115 HARV. L. REv. 642, 652 (2001). 
160. Watson, 487 U.S. at 993. 
161. Marvin Jones observes that in their application of antidiscrimination law to the workplace, 
courts have operated on the premise that "the employer's 'traditional prerogatives' survive Title Vll-
that, in effect, the statute's parameters are framed by common law baselines. The employer's liberty to 
be free in his domain of any constraints anchors a notion that in the employer's domain he should be 
free of the government's intruding gaze." Jones, supra note 62, at 2354. 
162. Watson, 487 U.S. at 999. Such deference, moreover, was consistent with the virtue of 
judicial restraint. Courts should bear in mind that they "are generally less competent than employers to 
restructure business practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it." ld. 
(citing Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978». 
163. ld. 
164. ld. at 1001 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the jUdgment). 
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evidentiary innovations embraced by the Watson plurality were adopted 
by a five-Justice majority the following term, in Wards Cove Packing v. 
Atonio. 165 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, amending the 1964 Act to provide the 
first explicit statutory sanction of disparate impact liability, effectively 
overturned the most radical aspects of Watson and Wards Cove. The 
Act's rendering of the business necessity defense was the subject of a 
protracted and highly politicized negotiation between the first Bush 
administration and congressional Democrats. The two sides ultimately 
"resolved" the issue by leaving the terms of the revamped standard 
deliberately ambiguous. 166 Most courts and legal scholars agreed, 
165. 490 U.s. 642 (1989). Justice White's majority opinion echoed Watson's preoccupation with 
discouraging quotas; its refusal to presume racial proportionality absent discrimination; its deference to 
employers' managerial prerogatives; and its equation of instrumental rationality with nondiscrimination. 
Perhaps most importantly, however, Wards Cove crystallized the market rationality standard, holding 
that the dispositive issue in a business necessity inquiry was "whether a challenged practice serves, in a 
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer." Id. at 659. "The touchstone of this 
inquiry," Justice White explained, was "a reasoned review of the employer's justification for his use of 
the challenged practice .... [T)here is no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 
'indispensable' to the employer's business for it to pass muster." Id. This formulation decisively 
rejected the relatively strict necessity standard of Griggs, Albermarle, and Dothard, in favor of 
something closer to a test for mere business rationality. 
In so doing, Wards Cove amplified an impulse that remained relatively latent in Watson: the 
encroachment of a discriminatory intent requirement into disparate impact analysis. The underlying 
purpose of the business necessity inquiry had changed. Its basic function was no longer to induce 
employers to scrutinize the true value of certain presumably well-intentioned practices, but rather to 
smoke out pretextual invidious discrimination. "A mere insubstantial justification" for a challenged 
practice was insufficient, the Court acknowledged, "because such a low standard of review would permit 
discrimination to be practiced through the use of spurious, seemingly neutral employment practices." 
!d. In theory, of course, "spurious" and "seemingly neutral" practices were the subject of disparate-
treatment analysis. This new distribution of evidentiary burdens, explained Justice White, "conforms to 
the rule in disparate-treatment cases that the plaintiff bears the burden of disproving an employer's 
assertion that the adverse employment action or practice was based solely on a legitimate neutral 
consideration." Id. at 660. One might query, would it mean for the plaintiff to prove that an 
employment practice was based on an iflegitimate or non-neutral consideration, if not that the 
challenged facially neutral practice was, in fact, a pretext for intentional discrimination? By saddling 
plaintiffs with the burden of disproving a defendant's assertion that a challenged practice served a 
legitimate business purpose, the majority appeared to redefine the core evil that disparate impact 
analysis was designed to redress-from practices which, though neutral on their face and in intent, 
resulted in a racially disproportionate impact, to practices designed as facially neutral subterfuges for 
intentional discrimination. 
166. The Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove set off a vigorous two-year political debate 
over disparate impact liability, and particularly over the proper definition of "business necessity." 
Congressional Democrats proposed a civil rights bill that essentially overturned Wards Cove, and 
defined business necessity as "essential to effective job performance." Peter M. Leibold, et aI., Civil 
Rights Act of 1991: Race to the finish-Civil Rights, Quotas, and Disparate Impact in /991, 45 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1043,1072 (1993). Congress passed the Democratic bill in 1990, but President Bush 
vetoed it, dubbing it a "quota bill" on the theory that a strict necessity standard would compel employers 
to hire by race (and gender) to avoid liability. !d. at 1071-72 n.113. The President backed a Senate 
Republican bill that essentially would have codified the market rationality standard of Watson and 
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however, that the compromise rule codified by Congress was closer to 
the strict necessity standard of Griggs and Dothard than the test for mere 
instrumental rationality set forth in Watson and Wards Cove. 167 
Wards Cove. Under that bill, a challenged practice was "justified by business necessity" so long as it 
had "a manifest relationship to the employment in question or that the respondent's legitimate 
employment goals are significantly served by, even if they do not require, the challenged practice." Id. 
at 1072. 
The following year, moderate Senate Republicans brokered a compromise that deliberately left 
ambiguous the precise meaning of business necessity. Under Section 105(a) of the 1991 Act, once a 
plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of disparate impact, a defendant could escape liability by 
"demonstrat[ing] that the challenged practice is job-related for the position in question and consistent 
with business necessity." Pub. L. No. \02-166, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.c.). The interpretive memorandum accompanying the Act did little to clarifY 
matters, explaining that the terms "job-related" and "business necessity" were '''intended to reflect the 
concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs . .. and in other Supreme Court decisions prior to 
Wards Cove.'" Spiropoulos, supra note 63, at 1512 (quoting 137 CONGo REc. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 
25, 1991)). Under this formulation, Bush administration officials could, and did, claim that the Act had 
simply codified Wards Cove, on the theory that the standard set forth in that case reflected an accurate 
synthesis of Supreme Court precedent up to that time. Senate Democrats and moderate Republicans, by 
contrast, maintained that Section 105(a) implemented a strict necessity standard, citing the Act's 
rejection of Wards Cove by name. Id. at 1514. 
167. See Grover, supra note 62; Leibold, et aI., supra note 166; Merrick Rossein, Disparate 
Impact Theory After the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Restoring the Job Performance Standard, 429 
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 155 
(1992). The Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the meaning of business necessity under the 
1991 Act. Notwithstanding Congress' express rejection of the Wards Cove standard, however, the 
Court's general hostility to racial proportionality reasoning has continued to shape disparate impact 
doctrine. In particular, over the past several years, the Court has sharply circumscribed Congress' 
authority under Section 5 to prohibit forms of discrimination that have not been declared 
unconstitutional by the Judicial Branch. See, e.g., City of Boeme V. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) 
(holding that Congress lacked authority under Section 5 to enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, and drawing a sharp distinction between the power to "enforce" the Constitution and the power to 
define unconstitutional conduct); Kimel V. Florida Bd of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that 
Congress lacked Section 5 authority to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to actions 
brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967); United States V. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked Section 5 authority to create, in the Violence Against Women 
Act, a federal civil action for gender-based violence). But see Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 
538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (upholding Congress's Section 5 authority to enact provisions of the Family 
and Medical Leave Act proscribing "facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter 
unconstitutional conduct"). Although Title VII does not traffic in express racial classifications, the fact 
that disparate impact enforcement sometimes is animated by a racially allocative motive could 
theoretically trigger the same exacting standard of constitutional review that applies to other racially 
motivated state action, such as affirmative action. 
Operating in the shadow of this prospect, lower courts posed with the question of whether disparate 
impact liability is an improper exercise of Congress's Section 5 power have begun to minimize the very 
features of disparate impact that make it a uniquely ambitious form of antidiscrimination law: the fact 
that the absence of discriminatory intent does not absolve defendants of liability for employment 
practices which, though instrumentally rational, disproportionately burden members of a protected class. 
The Eleventh Circuit concluded, for example, that in order for the court to uphold the Civil Rights Act's 
disparate impact provisions as valid Section 5 enforcement legislation, it would have to find that "the 
core congressional motivation" behind disparate impact was "consistent with the notion that what the 
Constitution prohibits is intentional discrimination on the part of state actors (and not state action that 
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B. Ethnic Difference and Equal Protection: Public Contracting 
As in the case of disparate impact liability, the Supreme Court drew 
directly on the coordinate discourses of black ethnicity and social 
engineering to purge the presumption of racial proportionality from 
equal protection review. In doing so, it remade constitutional review of 
affirmative action in the image of the colorblind marketplace. Recall 
that in the 1980 Fullilove case, the Supreme Court's willingness simply 
to infer that present racial disparities in the construction industry 
reflected the direct, continuing effects of past discrimination ratified 
Congress's adoption of a federal minority set aside program as 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. As I argued above, 
that inference rested squarely on the Court's strong background 
presumption of racial proportionality. By the end of the decade, 
however, that presumption had given way to a discourse of racial 
inequality centering instead on ethnic group preferences, as the Court 
adopted a very different theory of how economic opportunities would 
likely be distributed in a world without discrimination. 
Perhaps more than any other decision, the 1989 case of Croson v. City 
of Richmond starkly illustrates the doctrinal impact of the 
colorblindnesslblack ethnicity/social engineering critique of racial 
proportionality on the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence. 
Under review in Croson was the Richmond Plan, a city ordinance 
requiring prime construction contractors receiving city contracts to 
subcontract at least thirty percent of the contract value to minority 
business enterprises. 168 In contrast to Chief Justice Burger's majority 
decision in Fullilove, both Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion and 
Justice Scalia's concurrence subjected the Richmond Plan to strict 
leads merely to discriminatory reSUlts.)" In re: Employment Discrimination against the State of 
Alabama, 198 F.3d 1305 (1 lth Cir. 1999). "Though the plaintiff is never explicitly required to 
demonstrate discriminatory motive," the court reasoned, "a genuine finding of disparate impact can be 
highly probative of the employer's motive since a racial imbalance is often a tell tale sign of purposeful 
discrimination." Id. at 1321 (quoting In!'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 
(1977)). In fact, "although the form of the disparate impact inquiry differs from that used in a case 
challenging state action directly under the Fourteenth Amendment, the core injury targeted by both 
methods of analysis remains the same: intentional discrimination." Id. at 1322. With this rendering of 
disparate impact, State of Alabama essentially revived the "sociological radar" approach of the pre-
Griggs era. Perhaps most importantly, it virtually obviated Title VII's long-standing scrutiny of 
employment practices that are instrumentally rational and free from discriminatory purpose, but which 
disproportionately burden a protected class. See generally Jolls, supra note 159; Robert C. Post & Reva 
B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 
110 YALE LJ. 441 (2000); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2003). 
168. 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989). 
132 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
constitutional scrutiny.169 Because the ordinance employed express 
racial classifications, it would only be upheld if it was narrowly tailored 
to serve a compelling state purpose. 
In Fullilove, the Court had virtually taken for granted the remedial 
purpose of the challenged statute. F or the Court to find that the 
"remedy" at issue in Croson served a compelling state purpose, 
however, the Richmond City Council would have to identify the alleged 
discrimination "with the particularity required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." 170 When the City Council enacted the ordinance, it had 
relied on a study showing that "while the general population of 
Richmond was 50% black, only 0.7% of the city's prime construction 
contracts had been awarded to minority businesses" over a recent five-
year period. l7l Notwithstanding this seventy-five-fold disparity between 
the percentage of blacks living in Richmond and the percentage of prime 
contracts awarded to minority contractors, the plurality flatly refused to 
infer that minority "underrepresentation" had anything to do with past 
discrimination in the construction industry. "It is sheer speculation," 
Justice O-Connor wrote, "how many minority firms there would be in 
Richmond absent past societal discrimination, just as it was sheer 
speculation how many minority medical students would have been 
admitted to the medical school at Davis absent past 
discrimination .... ,,172 Far from reflecting the effects of 
discrimination, there were "numerous explanations for this dearth of 
minority participation, including past societal discrimination in 
education and economic opportunities as well as both black and white 
career and entrepreneurial choices. Blacks may be disproportionately 
attracted to industries other than construction.,,173 This refusal to credit 
the documented racial disparity as evidence of discrimination-
particularly the suggestion that blacks, as a group, could be seventy-five 
times less "attracted" to construction than whites-reflects a truly 
dramatic rejection of the presumption of racial proportionality operating 
in Fullilove, as well as Title VII cases such as Griggs. 
The plurality's application of the narrow tailoring requirement was 
equally implausible. Given the magnitude of the disparity at issue, 
169. The plurality distinguished the case from Fullilove on the basis of Congress' superior 
authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment with appropriate legislation. "That Congress may 
identify and redress the effects of society-wide discrimination," Justice O'Connor wrote, "does not mean 
that, a fortiori, the States and their political subdivisions are free to decide that such remedies are 
appropriate." Id. at 490. 
170. Id. at 492. 
171. Id. at 479-80. 
172. Id. at 499. 
173. Id. at 503. 
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Justice O'Connor's treatment of Richmond's "30% quota" borders on 
hyperbole. She insisted that the program rested on "the completely 
unrealistic assumption that minorities will choose a particular trade in 
lockstep proportion to their representation in the local population .... 
[£]t is completely unrealistic to assume that individuals of one race will 
gravitate with mathematical exactitude to each employer ... absent 
unlawful discrimination.,,174 The plurality's assertion that the ordinance 
demanded "lockstep proportion" and "mathematical exactitude" appears 
almost cynical. As Justice Marshall noted in dissent, "[ w ]hile the 
measure affects 30% of public contracting dollars, that translates to only 
3% of overall Richmond area contracting.,,175 
Further, the plurality's rejection of Richmond's asserted purpose of 
remedying societal discrimination sounds explicitly in Bakke's "nation 
of minorities" argument. To accept the city's position that a mere 
finding of past societal discrimination warranted a system of "rigid 
racial preferences would ... open the door to competing claims of 
'remedial relief for every disadvantaged group. The dream of a Nation 
of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal 
opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting 
preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs.,,176 
To countenance such a principle, moreover, would require courts to 
perform the impossible task of evaluating "the extent of the prejudice 
and consequent harm suffered by various minority groups.,,177 
Croson illustrates the Court's almost seamless appropriation of the 
discourse of ethnic difference into its constitutional critique of racial 
proportionality. By advancing a narrative of minority 
"underrepresentation" that accounted for racial disparities not by 
reference to past discrimination, but rather through speculation about 
blacks' racially distinctive entrepreneurial interests and choices, the 
plurality disavowed the presumption of racial proportionality that 
underlay the Court's decision in Fullilove. Further, by declining to infer 
discrimination from even gross racial inequality, Croson saddled state 
and local governments seeking to redress inequality through race-
conscious means with a substantially heavier evidentiary burden. 
Six years later, in Adarand Construction v. Pena,178 the Supreme 
Court extended the holding in Croson to federal set-asides as well, 
174. Id. at 507-08 (emphasis added) (quoting Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 
U.S. 421,494 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
175. Id. at 548-48 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
176. /d. at 505-06. 
177. /d. at 506 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,296-97 (1978)). 
178. 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995). 
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establishing that even congressional efforts to remedy past 
discrimination by the federal government would be subject to strict 
scrutiny.179 Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Croson, as well as 
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, provided the analytical blueprint. In 
justifying the application of strict scrutiny to even "benign" 
discrimination, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion explicitly adopted 
Justice Powell's nation-of-minorities argument. Quoting directly from 
Bakke, the majority affirmed that because the "guarantee of equal 
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and 
something else when applied to persons of another color," "[r]acial and 
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the 
most exacting judicial examination.,,180 
C. The Ambiguous Legacy of Racial Proportionality: 
Affirmative Action in Higher Education 
As we have seen, during the 1980s the ethnicity critique of racial 
proportionality captured the imagination of various Supreme Court 
Justices, and in tum directly shaped the development of federal 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence. In Watson and Wards Cove, the Court 
retreated from Griggs, and in so doing rejected the key distinguishing 
elements of disparate impact liability. In Croson, the discourse of black 
ethnicity rationalized the Court's application of strict scrutiny to, and 
ultimate rejection of, racial preferences in competition for public 
construction contracts. In the context of affirmative action in higher 
education, however, the fate of racial proportionality as a constitutional 
value is considerably more ambiguous. 
Recall that in Bakke, Justice Powell held that even "benign" uses of 
race in university admissions were subject to strict constitutional 
scrutiny. 181 Under that standard, neither compensating a particular 
group for past discrimination, nor attempting to restore that group to the 
position it might have occupied but for the alleged discrimination, 
qualified as a compelling state purpose. Recall also, however, that 
ethnicity theory simultaneously supplied the sole constitutionally valid 
purpose for race-conscious admissions-namely, the attainment of 
student body diversity. As I argued above, the diversity rationale 
disavowed any interest in redressing racial inequality. Rather, the 
nominal "beneficiaries" of affirmative action were not the applicants 
whose minority status triggered the preference, but the overwhelmingly 
179. Id. at 227. 
ISO. Id. at 21S (quoting Bakke. 43S U.S. at 289-91). 
181. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
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white student body, which would benefit educationally from exposure to 
students ethnically different from themselves. 182 
Although civil rights activists, progressive constitutional scholars, and 
the four Bakke dissenters harshly criticized the strict scrutiny component 
of Powell's opinion, many within the civil rights coalition have long 
since adopted the diversity rationale as their own. For the past quarter 
century, the opinion has both provided the basic ground rules for 
university admissions programs,183 and framed the public and 
constitutional debate around affirmative action. And when the Supreme 
Court revisited the question of race-conscious university admissions in 
2003, the continuing constitutional validity of the diversity rational was 
squarely at issue. Although the case technically resulted in a split 
decision for the University of Michigan's affirmative action regime, the 
outcome has been widely viewed as a victory for affirmative action's 
defenders because the Court, by a margin of six to three, affirmed 
Bakke's holding that the attainment of a diversity student body 
constitutes a compelling state interest. 184 
How does the Court's opinion in Crutter v. Bollinger, the decision 
upholding Law School's admissions program, comport with its approach 
to disparate impact liability under Title VII, and with its analysis of 
racial preferences in public contracting under the Fourteenth 
Amendment? On the one hand, Crutter appears largely consistent with 
the Court's broader retreat from racial proportionality reasoning. Justice 
O'Connor's majority opinion faithfully recapitulates the key elements of 
the Bakke opinion. In particular, it reaffirms that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits a public university from employing race-
conscious means for the purpose of promoting racial equality, and insists 
that the university'S interest in attaining a diverse student body rests 
exclusively in its First Amendment right of "educational autonomy.,,185 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93. 
183. As the Court observed in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2002), "[s]ince this 
Court's splintered decision in Bakke, Justice Powell's opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has 
served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies. Public and 
private universities across the Nation have modeled their own admissions programs on Justice Powell's 
views on permissible race-conscious policies." 
184. In Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), the Court struck down the University's 
undergraduate admissions system on the grounds that its practice of assigning a fixed number of bonus 
points to minority applicants failed the narrow tailoring requirement. In Grutter v. Bollinger, however, 
the Court upheld the Law School admissions program, finding that its practice of considering an 
applicant's race as one of many qualitative factors was sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict 
scrutiny. 539 U.S. at 306. 
185. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329. "[G]iven the important purpose of public education and the 
expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment," O'Connor 
explained, the Court had long recognized that "universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional 
tradition." !d. 
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Indeed, the Law School's policy survived strict scrutiny precisely 
because it "did not purport to remedy past discrimination," or seek "to 
assure within its student body some specified percentage of a particular 
group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.,,186 Rather, it sought 
only "to enhance classroom discussion and the educational experience 
both inside and outside the classroom.,,187 To attempt more, the 
majority stresses, "would amount to outright racial balancing, which is 
patently unconstitutional. ,,188 
On the other hand, at several important junctures the majority's 
discussion of the meaning and value of student body diversity clearly 
exceeds the scope of permissible state interests prescribed by Justice 
Powell in Bakke. The remainder of this Section argues that even as 
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion purports to reject any interest in 
racial remediation or representation, and to adhere faithfully to the 
Bakke framework, it in fact substantially expands that framework in 
order to accommodate a range of ostensibly prohibited interests. In 
particular, under the rubric of the educational benefits that flow from a 
diverse student body, Grutter both reintroduces the banished concept of 
past discrimination, and revives the long-dormant value of racial 
representation. Let us consider four specific examples. 
First, recall that in Bakke the value of diversity consisted of the 
educational benefits that presumably would flow from the student 
body's "'wide exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as 
this Nation.,,189 Grutter nominally adopts this formulation but gives it a 
much richer and more pointed meaning. "Just as growing up in a 
particular region or having particular professional experiences is likely 
to affect an individual's views," reasons Justice O'Connor, "so too is 
one's own unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like 
our own, in which race unfortunately still matters.,,190 "By virtue of our 
Nation's struggle with racial inequality," she explains, underrepresented 
minority students "are both likely to have experiences of particular 
importance to the Law School's mission, and less likely to be admitted 
in meaningful numbers on criteria that ignore those experiences.,,191 
This language marks a subtle but important shift in the diversity 
rationale. In Bakke, Justice Powell's invocation of "our nation-of-
minorities" effectively extruded from contemporary racial inequality any 
186. Jd. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 30 (internal citations omitted)). 
187. Jd. at 319. 
188. Jd. at 331. 
189. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
190. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333. 
191. /d. at 338. 
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moral or legal import. By contrast, Justice O'Connor's gloss on 
Powell's opinion reads back into the notion of ethnic difference the joint 
presumption that minority applicants are likely to have experienced 
racial discrimination, and that their underrepresentation under a race-
blind admissions system is the direct consequence of that experience. 
Grutter thus reintroduces the concept of racial inequality-not, strictly 
speaking, as an argument per se for the constitutionality of racial 
preferences, but rather as a valuable and relevant experiential aspect of 
our nation's diversity. Although this revamped diversity interest 
remains doctrinally within the register of "educational benefits," its 
rhetorical force comes directly from its close association with racial 
discrimination and inequality. 
Second, Grutter transmutes diversity from, as Robert Post has put it, a 
"value intrinsic to the educational process itself' to an "instrument[] for 
the achievement of extrinsic social goodS."I92 By way of explaining 
how the value of student body diversity is "not theoretical but real,,,193 
the majority opinion describes its benefit to institutions well beyond the 
university itself. Drawing on an amicus brief submitted by several large 
corporate employers, the Court observes that "major American 
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly 
global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely 
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.,,194 If the majority had 
stopped there, we might simply interpret this passage as support for the 
claim that student body diversity promotes a certain functional utility-a 
set of valuable job skills-for the university graduates and the 
companies that employ them. In the very next sentence, however, the 
opinion quietly advances to a superficially related, though in fact 
entirely novel, argument: 
What is more, high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the 
United States military assert that, "[b]ased on [their] decades of 
experience," a "highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is 
essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide 
national security." ... At present, "the military cannot achieve an officer 
corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse unless the service 
academies and the ROTC used limited race-conscious recruiting and 
admissions policies.,,195 
Within the space of a single paragraph, Justice O'Connor moves directly 
192. Post, supra note 9, at 60. 
193. Grutter, 539 U.s. at 330. 
194. /d. 
195. Gruller, 539 U.S. at 331 (quoting Brief of Julius W. Becton, Jr. et a!., as Amici Curiae at 27) 
(first omission in original). 
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from the benefits to a class of racially non-specific future employees of 
exposure to diverse peoples and view points, to the benefits to the 
United States military of an actually racially diverse officer corps. 
Although the interest of achieving a racially diverse officer corps-or 
workforce, for that matter-shares little with Bakke's educational-
benefits framework beyond the superficial rubric of diversity, the 
passage treats the two as though they are logically congruent. In fact, 
the interest in promoting a racially diverse officer corps bears a 
significant resemblance to one of the state purposes that the Powell 
opinion expressly rejected-that of fostering a corps of minority 
physicians who would presumably be more inclined to practice in under-
served, predominantly minority areas. 196 At any rate, the pursuit of 
racial integration in institutions extrinsic to the university itself sounds 
much more clearly in the register of racial representation than in that of 
educational benefits. 197 
Third, relying explicitly on Brown and other seminal school 
desegregation cases, the Grutter majority both links the diversity 
rationale to the racial integration of higher education, and situates 
affirmative action within the narrative of the nation's long march toward 
equal opportunity. Because "education is the very foundation of good 
citizenship," the majority reasons, "the diffusion of knowledge and 
opportunity through public institutions of higher education must be 
accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity.,,198 "Access 
to legal education (and thus the legal profession)," it continues, "must be 
inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race and 
ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may 
participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and 
education necessary to succeed in America.,,199 Borrowing the rhetoric, 
though not the legal reasoning, of the United States' amicus brief 
submitted in support of the plaintiff, the majority concludes that 
"[ e ]ffective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in 
196. Regents ofUniv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,310--11 (1978). 
197. Indeed, each of the four Gruller dissenters explicitly accused the majority of sanctioning 
unlawful racial balancing. See Gruller, 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the 
"critical mass" rationale is "a sham to cover a scheme of racially proportionate admissions"); id. at 379 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (characterizing the Law School's admissions program as a "naked effort to 
achieve racial balancing"); id. at 389 (Kennedy, 1., dissenting) (characterizing the program as an "effort 
to achieve racial balance among []minorities"). Justice Thomas, in particular, made extensive rhetorical 
use of "social engineering" discourse. See id. at 350, 361, 369, 372 (denouncing university 
administrators' racial "meddling," "tinkering," and social "experimentation" with "other people's 
children"). 
198. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 483, 493 (1954» 
(omissions in original). 
199. ld. at 332-33. 
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the civic life of our nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, 
indivisible, is to be realized.,,20o 
This argument is notable for two reasons. As the emphasis on 
"accessibility" and minority "participation" indicate, it is concerned less 
with the educational benefits of diversity than with racial integration. In 
addition, it couples the integration of the Law School to the national 
project of redressing racial inequality and mending the nation's 
historical racial divide. In both respects, the majority locates the goals 
of the Law School policy-and affirmative action in university 
admissions more broadly-squarely within the school desegregation 
tradition inaugurated by Brown.201 
Fourth and finally, the majority expresses a keen awareness that 
conspicuous racial underrepresentation reflects poorly on the underlying 
justice of the American system. "In order to cultivate a set of leaders 
with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry," it reasons, "it is necessary 
that the path to leadership be visibly open to qualified individuals of 
every race and ethnicity.,,202 "All members of our heterogeneous society 
must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational 
institutions that provide this training," it continues, and because 
"universities, and in particular law school, re£resent the training ground 
for a large number of our Nation's leaders,,,2 3 racial inclusiveness takes 
on heightened importance. This argument, perhaps more than any other, 
suggests that more is at stake in race-conscious admissions than Justice 
Powell's nation-of-minorities framework could possibly contemplate. 
With her talk of "visibility" and public "confidence," Justice O'Connor 
is clearly concerned with appearances-both of the student body and of 
the nation's future leadership corps. Most importantly, however, her 
reference to ensuring "legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry" raises the 
specter of a much more profound problem: that minority 
underrepresentation-at the nation's elite public law schools and in civic 
life-implicates the fundamental justice of the American structure of 
opportuni ty. 204 
200. Id. at 332. 
201. Justice Scalia, in dissent, singled out the majority's "lessons in citizenship" interest for 
special contempt. Preparation for "good 'citizenship'" was not, he mocked, "an educational benefit on 
which students will be graded on their law school transcript (Works and Plays Well with Others: B+) or 
tested by the bar examiners (Q: Describe in 500 words or less your cross-racial understanding)." 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
202. Id. at 332 (emphasis added). 
203. Id. 
204. Justice Thomas found the majority's reference to public "legitimacy" an especially 
"disturbing" symptom of impermissible and unwise racial balancing. Gruffer, 539 U.S. at 373. "[Flor 
those who believe that every racial disproportionality in our society is caused by some kind of racial 
discrimination," he chided, "there can be no distinction between remedying societal discrimination and 
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Some or all of these four permutations of the diversity rationale-i) 
the assimilation of the experience of discrimination into the concept of 
viewpoint diversity; ii) the conflation of the educational benefits of 
student body diversity with actually integrated social and political 
institutions; iii) the attainment of student body diversity as an aspect of 
racial desegregation and citizenship training; and, iv) the preservation of 
public confidence in equality of opportunity-may well be compelling 
arguments in favor of race-conscious university admissions; none, 
however, falls within the scope of state interests previously sanctioned 
by the Supreme Court. Rather, the majority's explication, or 
reinterpretation, of the diversity interest suggests that, in spite of its 
emphatic disavowal of racial proportionality, several of the Justices 
remain unwilling, at least in the critical context of university admissions, 
to fully dissociate equal protection enforcement from the goals of racial 
remediation, integration, and equality. The discussion above suggests, 
to the contrary, that the diversity rationale obscures a cluster of other 
values-anti subordination values-that absolutely inform the Court's 
judgment about the constitutional permissibility of race-conscious 
admissions.205 
Does it matter that anti subordination values inform Grutter's 
constitutional justification for race-conscious university admissions only 
surreptitiously and without formal doctrinal recognition, rather than as 
constitutionally compelling state interests in their own right? After all, 
as this Section has demonstrated, Justice O'Connor's transmuted 
diversity rationale successfully accommodates, and even operationalizes, 
those values. On the other hand, by denying them a formal, secure 
doctrinal home, it also leaves them vulnerable. By refusing to afford 
any formal legal status to the prohibited interests in remediation, or 
integration, or racial representation, and instead relegating them to the 
constitutional netherworld of the diversity rationale, the Grutter majority 
suppresses candid doctrinal recognition of the enormous social, political, 
and moral stakes of affirmative action today. In so doing, it relieves the 
Court, and the rest of the nation, from having to confront directly the 
question of why, fifty years after Brown and forty years after the 1964 
Act, race-conscious public policy remains necessary to attain 
erasing racial disproportionalities in the country's leadership caste. And if the lack of proportional racial 
representation among our leaders is not caused by societal discrimination, then 'fixing' it is even less of 
a pressing public necessity." [d. at 373-74. 
205. Reva Siegel and Jack Balkin insightfully demonstrate how anti subordination values, though 
formally disfavored by the Court, have persistently and critically shaped the implementation of the 
anti classification rule and played an essential role in determining what antidiscrimination law permits 
and prohibits in practice. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 20, at 13-16. See also Post, supra note 9, at 
68 n.306 (noting that "[tJhe implicit logic of remedy actually pervades much of the rhetoric of Gnttter"). 
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meaningful racial integration?06 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Grutter seriously complicated the constitutional status of racial 
proportionality. In Croson, for example, Justice O'Connor had worried 
that if the Court were to sanction racial preferences, "[t]he dream of a 
Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant would be 
lost .... ,,207 In Grufter, by contrast, she declared that the racial 
preference at issue was not only constitutionally permissible but 
essential "if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.,,208 
The respective subject matter of the two cases-public construction 
contracting versus university admissions-may help to explain their 
different outcomes. Yet this alone cannot account for the Court's virtual 
inversion of social and constitutional reasoning. Rather, the Court's 
refusal to fully divorce antidiscrimination law from the value of racial 
proportionality-which is in may ways Justice O'Connor's refusal-
reveals the difficulty faced by all but the most unflinching partisans of 
colorblindness when that model is extended to its logical conclusion. 
Nathan Glazer confronted the same difficulty. Long among the 
nation's most sophisticated and influential critics of affirmative action, 
in 1998 Glazer came out in defense of racial preferences in university 
admissions, at least for African Americans. Writing in The New 
Republic, Glazer explained: 
Thirty years ago, with the passage of the great civil rights laws, one could 
have reasonably expected-as I did-that all would be set right by now. 
But today, even after taking account of substantial progress and change, it 
is borne upon us how continuous, rooted, and substantial the differences 
between African Americans and other Americans remain.209 
Under such conditions, "an insistence on color-blindness means the 
effective exclusion today of African Americans from positions of 
206. Justice Thomas, though writing from a nonnative perspective very different than that of this 
Article, raises a critique of affinnative action and the diversity rationale that is not totally foreign to the 
one suggested here. '" Diversity,' for all its devotees, is more a fashionable catchphrase that it is a useful 
tenn," and "presents only an illusory solution to the challenges facing our Nation." Grulter, 539 U.S. at 
355 n.3. As long as "it is sufficient that the class looks right, even if it does not perfonn right," the 
racial "aestheticists" who administer the University'S admissions system "will never address the real 
problems facing 'underrepresented minorities.'" Id. at 372 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
207. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989). 
208. 539 U.S. at 332. 
209. Nathan Glazer, In Defense of Preference, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 6, 1998 at 18,24. 
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influence, wealth, and power.,,210 Truly uncompromising opponents of 
affirmative action not only declare themselves prepared to accept such a 
result, Glazer explained, but believe that the abolition of preferences 
"will actually ... improve race relations.,,211 "Yet we cannot be quite so 
cavalier about the impact on public opinion-black and white--of a 
radical reduction in the number of black students" at the nation's elite 
universities, he cautioned. After all, such institutions are 
the gateways to prominence, privilege, wealth, and power in American 
society. To admit blacks under affirmative action no doubt undermines 
the American meritocracy, but to exclude blacks from them by abolishing 
affirmative action would undermine the legitimacy of American 
democracy? 12 
And what of the notion of black ethnicity--of the idea that African 
Americans, like Italian Americans, or Jewish Americans, or Japanese 
Americans, would, with time and struggle, be assimilated fully into the 
fabric of American life without the benefit of racial preferences? "[T]he 
varied ethnic and racial groups in the United States do not, to the same 
extent as African Americans, pose a test of the fairness of American 
institutions," Glazer explained. "These other groups have not been 
subjected to the same degree of persecution or exclusion. There status is 
not, as the social status of African Americans is, the most enduring 
reproach to the egalitarian ideals of American society.,,213 
As this Article has demonstrated, to the extent that the colorblindness 
model has reproduced conspicuous racial disparities, it has also 
generated neo-racialist accounts of black inequality. Through the 
discourse of black ethnicity, Justice Powell, Justice O'Connor, Glazer, 
Sowell, and a legion of other critics of racial proportionality fashioned a 
distinctly modem, ostensibly anti-racist account of racial difference, 
which they used to explain why most racial inequality lay beyond the 
proper scope of antidiscrimination law. The discourse of black 
ethnicity, I have argued, has enabled colorblindness proponents to 
mediate the contradiction between the genuinely egalitarian aspirations 
of the colorblindness ideal and the glaring racial inequalities that persist 
under that model. Both Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Grutter and 
Glazer's own intellectual reversal, however, suggest that this ideological 
edifice is crumbling. The discourse of black ethnicity may have 
furnished reassurance to conservative egalitarians striving to account for 
210. Id. at 18. 
211. Id. at 21. 
212. Id. at 24. 
213. Id. 
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the persistence of racial inequality in the wake of the 1964 Act. More 
than a generation later, however, the immigrant analogy perhaps offers 
less solace, as enduring, entrenched inequality looks less like a morally 
benign expression of ethnic difference than a grim referendum on the 
American structure of opportunity. 
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